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VENDOR FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND BUYERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF 
TRANSACTION COST AND RELATIONSHIP GOVERNANCE 
 
by 
Imran M. Khan 
 
 
The utilization of outsourced business services continues to grow as organizations 
focus on core competencies.  Outsourced services span the gamut from financial services 
to information processing to engagement of third party logistic services by enterprise 
customers.  When outsourcing business services, organizational buyers often have to 
select from a plethora of small, mid-sized, and large vendors that offer competing 
services at comparable prices.  Given this choice conundrum, what factors influence 
buyers’ perceptions of vendors and their capacity to deliver expected value?   
The current research integrates three distinct, yet related, theoretical streams 
including transaction cost, vendor selection, and buyer-seller relational exchange in 
studying how vendor firm attributes affect buyers’ perceptions of the vendor as well as 
their willingness-to-engage in a particular type of relationship exchange with the vendor.  
Two separate, but conceptually-related essays are offered to add some clarity to variables 
influencing vendor assessment and selection.  Essay 1 introduces vendor firm attributes 
as antecedents to the opportunism and uncertainty constructs thereby extending the 




reputation influence organizational buyers’ a priori perceptions of vendor opportunism 
and uncertainty.   
Essay 2 examines the influence of buyers’ opportunism and uncertainty 
perceptions on their relationship governance choices.  Concomitantly, Essay 2 studies 
how opportunism and uncertainty perceptions on the part of the buyer mediate the 
relationship between vendor firm characteristics and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in 
contractual and relational exchange/governance with a given vendor.   
A panel of IT buyers, across various industries, was surveyed to determine the 
impact of vendor attributes on buyers’ perceptions of opportunism and technological 
uncertainty associated with the vendor.  In addition, the survey also tested the 
relationship between buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty and 
their willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds and relational exchange with the 
vendor.  Results support the linkages between vendor firm reputation and buyers’ 
perceptions of opportunism and technological uncertainty.  Moreover, a direct linkage 
was found between vendor firm reputation and buyers’ relationship preferences.  
Implications are discussed along with limitations and areas of future research.  
 
Keywords: transaction cost, relational exchange, buyer-seller relationships, 
opportunism, uncertainty, information sharing, idiosyncratic investments, asset 
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, technological uncertainty, 
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The market for outsourced business services continues to expand (Duan, Grover, 
& Balakrishnan, 2009; Gholami, 2012; Lacity, Solomon, Yan, & Willcocks, 2011) as 
organizations focus on their core competencies and rely increasingly on outsourcing 
service providers to provide non-core, yet mission-critical services.  The growth of 
outsourced services is well-documented in many industry studies.  For instance, a recent 
study by Global Industry Analysts (GIA, 2011) shows that the global business process 
outsourcing market is expected to reach $280.7 billion by 2017.  Others such as Gartner 
Group (2011) estimate the worldwide market for outsourced information technology 
services to reach $983 billion in 2015, a figure that is larger than the GDP of countries 
such as Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, 
and many others according to the World Bank (2011).   
In that regard, organizations are outsourcing a range of functional activities 
including, but not limited to, manufacturing, advertising, payroll, and public relations.  
The definition of outsourcing is rather broad in that it refers to the purchase of any goods 
or services by an organization from an outside firm (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000).  
Outsourcing offers firms a range of advantages including reduction in capital and 
operating expenditures, faster time to market, and savings in human resource-related 






firms to take advantage of lower labor costs in less-developed countries.  Similarly, in the 
financial services sector, outsourced call centers enable organizations to offer cost-
effective, around the clock customer support to their banking customers.   
While the outsourcing phenomenon has existed for decades, the degree of 
outsourcing has escalated specifically within the information and communications 
technology (IT) sector (Bhali & Rivard, 2003; Gholami, 2012; Wang, 2002).  
Outsourcing of IT enables firms to leverage state-of-the art, ubiquitous networks capable 
of delivering reliable and cost-effective services.  Moreover, IT outsourcing provides 
firms with access to advanced services such as cloud computing, data centers, network 
security, and many other applications that otherwise would require significant internal 
investments in infrastructure.  Growth of outsourcing has essentially reshaped the 
historical “make or buy” debate into one that focuses on vendor evaluation and selection, 
a process that is just as integral as the outsourcing decision itself (Cao & Wang, 2007).  
In addition, outsourcing of various functions to overseas service providers has further 
added to the complexity of selecting and managing offshore vendors (Tate, Ellram, & 
Brown, 2009).   
Given the strategic significance of outsourcing decisions, it is incumbent upon 
scholars and practitioners to identify and understand which vendor firm attributes affect 
buyers’ perceptions of overall costs, particularly transaction costs.  Such an 
understanding is crucial as it influences various organizational processes and outcomes, 
including the buyers’ vendor evaluation and selection process as well as the ability of 






The expansion of outsourced services has attracted the attention of scholars from 
various schools of thought,  including transaction cost analysis (TCA), agency theory, 
service quality, and buyer-seller relational exchange scholars (e.g., Cannon & Perreault, 
1999; Mahaney & Lederer, 2011; Niranjan & Metri, 2008; Tiwana & Bush, 2007; 
Williamson, 2008).  In fact, TCA, the conceptual focus of this paper, constitutes the 
predominant foundation for outsourcing research as can be evidenced from the large 
number of outsourcing studies employing various TCA constructs (Bhali & Rivard 2003; 
Lonsdale, 2001; Stump & Heide, 1996; Wang 2002).  Similarly, buyer-seller relationship 
literature is rife with discussion of organizational outsourcing arrangements, thereby 
rendering it pertinent to this research (Cannon and Homburg, 2001; Hawkins, Knipper, & 
Strutton, 2009; Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995).   
Transaction cost theory, originally proposed by Coase (1937) and then developed 
upon by Williamson (1975), examines the efficacy of performing a particular transaction 
internally versus externally (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).  In that regard, 
TCA evaluates the benefits and disadvantages of outsourcing vis a vis in-house 
development of a product (Ang & Straub, 1998; Bhali & Rivard, 2003; McNally & 
Griffin, 2004).  TCA research shows that while in-house product development allows for 
better governance mechanisms and control over operations (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997), 
outsourcing provides firms with significant cost advantages and faster time to market 
(MacFarlan & Nolan, 1995).  Moreover, outsourcing can also expose the buyer to a 
variety of risks including unreliable service, lock-in agreements that eliminate 




Rivard, 2003).   
In addition, outsourcing can lead to the creation of potential competitors as is 
evidenced from the ongoing battles over intellectual property rights between many 
technology firms such as Apple, Inc. and Samsung.  Although Apple has utilized 
Samsung as a provider of components for its smartphones and other computing devices, 
its lawsuits asserted that Samsung copied and incorporated Apple’s product design and 
many of its features in its mobile communications products (Bosker & Grandoni, 2012; 
Wingfield, 2012).  Given the range of risks, from the buyers’ perspective, the decision to 
outsource is rather critical in that they not only have to select which organizational 
tasks/functions to outsource but also to whom (Foxx, Bunn, & McCay, 2009).  
Within the transaction cost research framework, both vendor opportunism and 
uncertainty have been identified as conditions favoring hierarchical governance over 
market arrangements (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Wathne & Heide, 2000), e.g., in-house 
development of products and services as opposed to outsourcing.  Opportunism is defined 
as “self-interest seeking with guile” by Williamson (1975) and can include behaviors 
such as cheating, misleading, and shirking.  Uncertainty is generally defined along two 
dimensions by TCA researchers: behavioral and environmental uncertainty (McNally & 
Griffin, 2004).  Behavioral uncertainty is related to the inability of the buyer to anticipate 
and accurately assess the post-contractual behavior of the supplier (Aubert, Patry, & 
Rivard, 1998; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  Environmental uncertainty includes changes 
in industry conditions such as demand fluctuations, technological requirements, etc., that 
would require potential amendments to the contracts (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; 




In an outsourcing arrangement, vendor opportunism and uncertainty often serve 
as antecedents that influence several important buyer-seller relationship outcomes such as 
cost and quality (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  For instance, opportunism is shown to have a 
negative influence on a buyer’s level of trust and commitment to a supplier (Mysen, 
Svensson, & Payan, 2010).  Similarly, evidence exists that vendor opportunism can 
hinder the success of an outsourcing project (Wang, 2002).  Moreover, higher 
opportunism risk forces firms to expend resources on developing and employing effective 
vendor monitoring and control mechanisms thereby leading to higher opportunity costs 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000).   
The incidence of vendor opportunism is likely to be high in many buyer-seller 
exchanges given the significant competitive pressures faced by suppliers in a range of 
industries (Hadfield 1990; Murry & Heide, 1998; Phillips, 1982).  Also, greater focus on 
long-term outsourcing contracts as well as relationship-specific investments among 
buyers and sellers further lead to lock-in conditions that generally foster opportunism 
(Lonsdale, 2001).  Opportunism is likely to be a threat specifically in high-tech industries 
where both buyers and sellers of hardware components, software, and services often 
compete for the same customer.  For instance, while Google competes with Apple in the 
mobile phone market, Google was also the supplier of various critical applications to 
Apple, Inc., such as Google Maps.  Apple’s eventual decision to develop its own Maps 
application for its iPhone and iPad devices largely stemmed from Google’s unwillingness 
to continue to make timely improvements to the application for devices that ran Apple’s 
operating system (Hardy, 2012).  Google, however, continued to improve the application 




Likewise, while Microsoft marketed its Windows mobile operating system to 
various device manufacturers such as Samsung, the company also competed directly with 
Samsung and others in the tablet computing device market via its Surface tablet.  Similar 
examples exist across other industries such as telecommunications services, whereby 
wireless operators often engage in purchasing network access from each other, hence 
exposing them to the risk of partner/supplier opportunism.         
Behavioral uncertainty essentially renders it difficult for the buyer to assess 
whether the vendor has performed according to terms of the contract (Geyskens et al., 
2006).  Environmental uncertainty, on the other hand, can have a negative impact on the 
willingness of a firm to outsource (Paulraj & Chen, 2007).  In addition, higher degree of 
behavioral and environmental uncertainty would force the buyer to either make 
contractual adjustments and or invest in robust monitoring systems to protect against 
uncertainty (Bhali & Rivard 2003; Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008; Hawkins et al., 2009; 
Mysen et al., 2010).  Consistent changes to existing contracts as well as investments in 
monitoring systems can increase a buyer’s overall operating costs.  The inability of the 
buyer to evaluate vendor performance has been shown to influence the proclivity of a 
vendor to engage in opportunistic behavior (Anderson, 1988; Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997).  Behavioral uncertainty is also positively related to the willingness of the buyer to 
use in-house resources (as opposed to outsourcing) as well as having full ownership of 
foreign operating subsidiaries rather than using joint ventures or alliances (Anderson & 
Schmittlein, 1984; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988).    
Environmental uncertainty, specifically higher risk of technological obsolescence, 




(Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986).  In addition, both behavioral and environmental 
uncertainties serve as precursors to opportunism (Mysen et al., 2010).  Furthermore, 
uncertainty and opportunism also encourage organizations to seek in-house development 
or backsource (bring back in-house) activities that have previously been outsourced 
thereby negatively affecting vendor revenues or their ability to win new business 
(Whitten & Leidner, 2006).  Current TCA research has focused on the behavioral 
(opportunism) as well as transaction-related attributes (uncertainty).  There is a general 
lack of emphasis on analyzing how vendor firm attributes influence buyers’ perceptions 
of opportunism and uncertainty as both these variables influence overall transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1975).  Similarly, buyers’ negative perceptions can constrain the ability of 
an outsourcing vendor to win business.      
Agency theory has also been utilized to study contractual arrangements within an 
outsourcing context.  Agency relationships, as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 
308) are formed “when one party (principal) engages or contracts another party (agent) to 
perform a particular task(s) on their behalf and that the task involves assigning of or 
transferring some decision-making authority from the principal to the agent.”  The 
general premise of agency theory is that the principal and the agent have conflicting goals 
and while the principal is risk neutral, the agent is generally risk-averse (Godfrey & Hill, 
1995).  The inability of the principal to effectively monitor agent behavior further adds to 
the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
Two key variables in agency research include moral hazard and information 
asymmetry (Fama, 1980).  Moral hazard, which is similar to the opportunism concept in 




safeguard personal interests which may be in conflict with the interests of the principal.  
Information asymmetry is defined as the inability of the principal to monitor agent’s 
behavior including before and during the contract term (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The 
information asymmetry, whereby one party to an exchange has more information than the 
other, that exists between buyers and sellers further complicates vendor selection in that it 
can lead to adverse selection as well as higher monitoring costs for the buyer (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Within an outsourcing context, the potential of moral hazard and information 
asymmetry are identified as key variables that influence the decision of the principal to 
engage in a particular governance mechanism, i.e., behavioral vs. outcome-based 
contracts.  Combined, moral hazard and information asymmetry can influence various 
outcomes associated with an outsourcing relationship including cost, quality, and 
customer support.  
Although transaction cost as well as agency theory researchers have studied inter-
organization outsourcing arrangements (Dawson, 2002; Mahaney & Lederer, 2011; 
Whitten & Leidner, 2006), there exists a research gap regarding the influence of vendor 
firm characteristics on buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty.   
Alternatively, traditional transaction cost and agency theory literature streams have not 
considered the impact of vendor firm attributes such as size and reputation on transaction 
cost variables of opportunism and uncertainty.  Understanding of these linkages is crucial 
for scholars and practitioners alike given the continuing increase in outsourcing activity 
and the presence of a wide array of vendor types offering comparable value propositions.    
For academicians, the linkages between vendor firm attributes and transaction 




literature.  In that regard, while both agency and transaction cost literatures have 
proposed a variety of vendor governance mechanisms, they have failed to study whether 
vendor firm attributes serve as antecedents to the core variables (opportunism and 
uncertainty) that affect governance choices.  From practitioners’ perspective, it is 
important to understand the relationship between vendor firm attributes and buyers’ 
perceptions of opportunism and uncertainty, as such knowledge can assist in outsourcing 
vendor evaluation processes.   
Within the relational exchange and vendor selection literature streams, various 
scholars have studied the influence of variables such as vendor size, mutual trust, 
commitment, long-term orientation, reputation, cost, quality, information exchange, and 
relationship-specific investments on buyer-seller relationships (Kwon & Suh. 2004; 
Macneil, 1980; Morgan & Hunt 1994; Ono & Kubo, 2009; Pearson & Ellram, 1995; 
Petroni & Braglia, 2000).  Most of these studies, however, do not incorporate the impact 
of vendor firm attributes on buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty.  
For instance, while Kwon and Suh (2004) studied the influence of variables such as 
behavioral uncertainty on buyers’ level of trust and commitment, their research did not 
incorporate how vendor size may affect uncertainty perceptions of the buyer.   
Similarly, while Ganesan (1994) identified various determinants of long-term 
orientation in buyer-seller relationships, the research lacked in studying whether vendor 
firm size affects the long-term orientation of the supplier.  Large and small vendors enjoy 
varying perceptions, on the part of the buyer, with regard to their operational capabilities.  
For instance, while small vendors are often cited as having short-term orientation 




large vendors can expose the buying firm to the risk of opportunism (Wathne & Heidi, 
2000). 
Other vendor selection research has mainly focused on studying the influence of 
variables such as cost, quality, customer satisfaction, and delivery reliability (Hsu, 
Kannan, Leong, & Tan, 2006; Petroni, 2000; Sarkis & Talluri, 2002) on the likelihood of 
purchase from a particular vendor.  This research stream has largely excluded vendor 
opportunism and uncertainty from the vendor evaluation criteria despite the fact that both 
these variables can have a direct influence on many vendor evaluation metrics such as 
cost, quality, and reliability.  Given that opportunism and uncertainty impact many 
outcomes in buyer-seller relationships, it is important to understand how the incidence of 
opportunism and uncertainty aligns with small vs. large outsourced solution providers. 
Overall, the monumental growth of outsourced business services has essentially 
rendered the make-or-buy and the markets vs. hierarchies’ debate rather obsolete in that 
outsourced services have become an integral component of organizational success.   
Specifically in the case of information technology (IT) services, fewer organizations are 
inclined to develop in-house solutions due to a variety of reasons such as lack of 
expertise, risk of technological obsolescence, and higher capital as well as operating 
expenses associated with such initiatives.  The cost efficiencies inherent in outsourcing 
are the leading drivers behind greater demand for such services (MacFarlan & Nolan, 
1995).   
When purchasing outsourced business services, it is likely that an organization is 
more concerned with transactions that reduce overall costs in comparison to those 




need for repositioning the historical make-or-buy debate to one that also takes into 
consideration vendor firm attributes and their impact on organizational buyers’ 
perceptions of transaction costs as well as their relationship choices with a vendor. 
Purpose and Contribution 
This research integrates three distinct, yet related, theoretical streams including 
transaction cost, vendor evaluation, and relational exchange in studying how vendor firm 
attributes affect buyers’ perceptions as well as their willingness-to-engage in an exchange 
with the vendor.  Figure 1.1 offers the summary research model. 
Figure 1.1: Summary Research Model 
 
In doing so, this research fills several conceptual and managerial gaps associated 
with these three streams.  First, existing TCA research has focused on transaction 
attributes to predict make-or-buy decisions and has not taken into account how vendor 
firm attributes influence buyers’ perceptions of overall transaction costs once the decision 
to outsource has been made.  Second, vendor evaluation research fails to include 
opportunism and uncertainty as part of the vendor evaluation criteria given that both 
variables can impact many outcomes in a buyer-seller exchange.  Lastly, the relational 




perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty and how these perceptions influence 
buyers’ willingness-to-engage in a relational exchange with a potential vendor.  
Essay 1 focuses on studying how vendor firm attributes influence perceived 
degree of opportunism and uncertainty on the part of the buyer as such perceptions can 
impact the ability of a vendor to win outsourcing business.  Essay 1’s first contribution is 
that it introduces vendor firm characteristics, size and reputation, as antecedents to the 
fundamental transaction cost constructs of opportunism and uncertainty within the 
context of outsourced business services.  Current TCA research mainly focuses on asset 
specificity and bounded rationality as antecedents of supplier opportunism and 
uncertainty within the context of outsourced manufacturing and or production-related 
activities (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Hawkins et al., 2009; Lonsdale, 2001; Stump & 
Heide, 1996; Wang, 2002).  Existing TCA research lacks analysis on the impact of 
vendor firm characteristics on buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty 
with regard to outsourced business services.   
Both vendor firm size and reputation have been used by a variety of vendor 
selection and buyer-seller relationship scholars (Carmel & Nicholson, 2005; Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Homer, 1985; Pearson & Ellram, 1995).  
Supplier firm attributes such as size and reputation have been shown to influence buyers’ 
perceptions of vendor capability, trustworthiness, and commitment, (Larson et al., 2005; 
Doney & Cannon, 1997).  Similarly, empirical research shows that higher potential 
vendor opportunism and uncertainty often encourage in-house product/service 
development as opposed to outsourcing of such activities (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  By 




uncertainty, Essay 1 extends the traditional transaction cost perspective beyond make-or-
buy and relationship governance decisions to one that involves vendor evaluation. 
A second contribution of Essay 1 is that it expands the existing supplier selection 
and purchasing literature.  Both opportunism and uncertainty, while impacting important 
outcomes in buyer-seller exchanges (Wathne & Heide, 2000), have not been used in 
vendor evaluation and selection models.  In doing so, this research examines whether 
buyers’ perceive the incidence of higher overall transaction costs when purchasing 
outsourced services from small vs. large vendors.  In that regard, Essay 1 further shifts 
the focus of transaction cost from the make-or-buy and relationship governance debates 
to one that helps organizations in their vendor selection processes.   
Essay 1’s third contribution focuses on helping business-to-business service 
providers identify and understand how vendor firm characteristics affect buyers’ 
perceptions of potential opportunism and uncertainty associated with a vendor.  Such an 
understanding is important from the vendors’ perspective as opportunism and uncertainty 
perceptions can influence buyers’ decisions to outsource (Ang & Straub, 1998).  
Moreover, ex ante perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty can also impact the 
perceived risk involved in outsourcing (Aubert et al., 1998), hence affecting a vendor’s 
ability to win new business.  Furthermore, understanding of buyers’ perceptions can also 
help outsourcing vendors develop and implement marketing mix strategies that aim at 
improving their overall positioning. 
The goal of Essay 2 is to test the influence of buyers’ opportunism and 
uncertainty perceptions on two key outcome variables, i.e., the willingness-to-engage in 




services/solutions.  Another objective of Essay 2 is to analyze how transaction cost 
variables of opportunism and uncertainty mediate the relationship between vendor firm 
attributes and the relationship governance choices of the buyers.  Contractual relations 
between buyers and sellers involve the use of legal bonds whereby each party is obligated 
to perform certain activities as specified in the contract (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Platz 
& Temponi, 2007).  A relational exchange, in contrast, may take various forms including 
joint investment in relationship-specific assets as well as effective and continuous sharing 
of information among exchange partners (Barringer, 1997).   
To date, the relational exchange literature has not incorporated the influence of 
perceived vendor opportunism and uncertainty on the proclivity of the buyer to engage in 
a relationship with a particular vendor.  In that regard, Essay 2 extends existing relational 
exchange literature by adding vendor opportunism and uncertainty as antecedents that 
influence buyers’ willingness-to-engage in a relational and contractual exchange with a 
particular vendor.  While opportunism and uncertainty impact many relational exchange 
outcomes such as trust and commitment (Kwon, 2004; Ono & Kubo, 2009), there is a 
lack of research examining  how these variables mediate the relationship between vendor 
firm attributes and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in relational and or contractual 
exchange.  Overall, current B2B research has not combined transaction cost, vendor 








CHAPTER 2 (ESSAY 1) 




The purpose of this paper is to measure the influence of vendor firm 
characteristics on organizational buyers’ perceptions of overall transaction costs related 
to B2B services outsourcing.  The past two decades have seen a continuing increase in 
demand for outsourced B2B services.  The growth in outsourcing has led to a renewed 
focus on vendor evaluation and selection criteria since many core and non-core functions 
that were previously being performed in-house are now being outsourced to domestic and 
foreign outsourced services providers.  Inept vendor selection can have an adverse impact 
on the financial and operational aspects of an organizational buyer.   
While transaction cost researchers have extensively studied outsourcing 
arrangements, they have failed to study how vendor firm characteristics affect buyers’ a 
priori perceptions of overall transaction costs associated with that vendor.  Vendor firm 
characteristics such as size and reputation are at the core of vendor evaluation and 
selection research, however, the transaction cost literature has not studied how these 
variables influence buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty once the 
decision to outsource has been made.  Similarly, despite the fact that both opportunism 






seller exchange, these variables remain absent from the vendor evaluation and selection 
literature.   
This paper combined two research streams in studying how vendor firm size and 
reputation influence buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty as they 
evaluate various outsourced services providers.  The hypotheses were tested on a panel of 
IT buyers across a range of industries.  Findings provide support for the linkages between 
vendor firm reputation and buyers’ ex ante or a priori perceptions of opportunism and 
uncertainty associated with the vendor.  Results also provide support for the linkage 
between opportunism and technological uncertainty.  Implications are discussed along 
with limitations and future research. 
 
 
Keywords: transaction cost analysis, IT outsourcing, opportunism, technological 








The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of vendor firm characteristics 
on organizational buyers’ a priori perceptions of overall transaction costs within a B2B 
outsourcing services context.  Within the organizational markets, the trend toward 
outsourcing continues to grow as companies focus on core competencies and seek 
operational cost reductions (Ang & Straub, 1998; Lacity, Solomon, Yan, & Willcocks, 
2011).  Outsourcing is defined as the use of external firms to perform a variety of 
business functions that otherwise would be performed in-house (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000).  Outsourced activities include manufacturing and production as well as utilization 
of business services including payroll processing, legal services, web designing and 
hosting, advertising, IT network management, data center services, and many others (Loh 
& Venkatraman, 1992).   
While the degree of outsourcing varies from one firm to another and from one 
industry to another (Whitten & Leidner, 2006), demand for outsourced business services 
is expected to continue to grow over the next several years.  Gartner Group (2011) 
estimates the worldwide market for outsourced information technology services to reach 
$983 billion in 2015.  Improvements in technology, growth in competition, and the 
continuing movement toward globalization that has led to reduced trade barriers among 
nations is further spurring utilization of outsourced business services, specifically 
offshore outsourcing (Shih, 2011; Taylor 2007).   
Growth in outsourcing has invited significant attention from both the academic 
and practitioner communities.  Within academia, outsourcing has been studied by a  




exchange, and service quality research streams (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Mahaney & 
Lederer, 2011; Niranjan & Metri, 2008; Richmond, Seidmann, & Whinston, 1992; 
Tiwana & Bush, 2007; Williamson, 2008).  Transaction cost analysis, hereafter TCA, 
which is the focus of this paper, was originally proposed by Coase (1937) and then 
significantly improved upon by Williamson (1975).  TCA evaluates whether a transaction 
can be more effectively and efficiently performed in-house or by external firms 
(Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006), hence rendering it pertinent to the outsourcing 
discussion.     
The decision to outsource is rather complex in that it requires organizations to not 
only identify what processes and functions to outsource but also from which vendors 
(Foxx, Bunn, & McCay, 2009).  In that regard, outsourcing organizations often have to 
choose from among a range of small, medium, and large vendors that vary in their 
capabilities. Ineffective vendor selection can expose the outsourcing firm to a variety of 
risks such as loss of control, dependence on vendors/suppliers, and degradation of 
product/service quality (Bhali & Rivard, 2003).  Such risks, when materialized, defeat the 
very objectives behind outsourcing, i.e., cost savings as the outsourcing firm may find 
itself making costly post-contractual changes or investing in monitoring systems (Walker 
& Weber, 1984, Williamson, 1975).   
TCA has been employed by a range of scholars to study outsourcing (Bhali & 
Rivard 2003; Lonsdale, 2001; Stump & Heide, 1996; Wang 2002).  However, extant 
literature has focused only on evaluating the impact of transaction attributes and 
behavioral factors on an organization’s make-or-buy decision.  In addition, while TCA 




have suggested a range of governance mechanisms in inter-firm relations including 
outsourcing, they have failed to incorporate how vendor firm characteristics influence the 
decision to employ a specific governance mechanism a priori.  In essence, current TCA 
research has not examined how vendor firm characteristics influence buyers’ a priori 
perceptions of the overall transaction costs associated with a particular vendor.   
Vendor firm characteristics such as size and reputation are at the core of most 
suppliers’ evaluation as well as buyer-seller relational exchange research (Carmel & 
Nicholson, 2005; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Homer 1985; Pearson & 
Ellram, 1995).  However, TCA researchers have not studied the influence of these 
attributes on buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty in an 
outsourcing arrangement.  Similarly, vendor evaluation and selection research has 
excluded vendor opportunism and uncertainty in its analysis (Dickson, 1996; Hsu, 
Kannan, Leong, & Tan, 2006; Petroni & Braglia, 2000; Verma & Pullman, 1998).   
Understanding of linkages between vendor attributes and buyers’ a priori 
perceptions of opportunism and uncertainty helps purchasers of outsourced services 
reduce the likelihood of selecting an inept vendor.  Opportunism, defined as self-interest 
seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975) and uncertainty, defined as inability to anticipate 
environmental changes and evaluate supplier performance (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) 
are central constructs with the TCA research stream.  Both opportunism and uncertainty 
are shown to influence a range of outcomes such as service quality and costs in an 
outsourcing arrangement (Wathne & Heide, 2000). Opportunism can emerge in both ex 
ante (pre-contract) and ex post (post-contract) stages in an inter-firm relationship.      




on ex post opportunism and uncertainty and how they influence the make or buy decision 
as well as relationship governance mechanisms (Jap & Anderson, 2003; Lonsdale, 2001; 
Mysen, Svensson, & Payan, 2010; Stump & Heide; 1996; Wang, 2002).   The purpose of 
this paper is to measure the influence of vendor firm characteristics on organizational 
buyers’ a priori perceptions of overall transaction costs related to a particular vendor. 
Measurement of ex ante or a priori opportunism and uncertainty perceptions can help 
buyers reduce the risk of adverse selection i.e., the likelihood of engaging in a 
relationship with a vendor that lacks required capability or commitment (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Therefore, by linking vendor firm characteristics to buyers’ perceptions of 
opportunism and uncertainty, this research extends the traditional transaction cost 
perspective beyond governance mechanisms to one that involves vendor evaluation.  A 
second contribution of this research is that it expands existing supplier selection research 
as well as the purchasing literature.  Both opportunism and uncertainty, while impacting 
important outcomes in buyer-seller exchanges (Wathne & Heide, 2000), have not been 
combined with vendor evaluation and selection variables such as size and reputation.   
A third contribution of this research focuses on helping business-to-business 
service providers identify and understand how vendor firm characteristics affect buyers’ 
perceptions of potential opportunism and uncertainty associated with a vendor.  From a 
vendor’s perspective, higher degree of opportunism and uncertainty perceptions can 
influence an organization’s decision to outsource (Ang & Straub, 1998; Earl, 1996), 
thereby reducing vendor revenue growth opportunities.  Understanding of buyers’ a priori 
perceptions can also help outsourcing vendors develop and implement marketing mix 




viewpoint, effective comprehension of the relationship between vendor firm 
characteristics and transaction cost constructs of opportunism and uncertainty can provide 
them with a holistic perspective on vendor evaluation and selection process.   
Background Literature 
This section begins with a review of existing research on transaction cost 
followed by background literature on variables of interest, namely vendor firm size, 
vendor reputation, opportunism, and uncertainty.  The paper then moves on to establish 
linkages between vendor firm attributes and how they influence buyers’ a priori or ex 
ante (pre-contract) perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty.  Figure 2.1 
provides the hypothesized model tested in this study. 








Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) 
 Transaction cost analysis was initially developed by Coase (1937) but was 
significantly expanded upon by Williamson (1975).  Transaction cost is at the heart of 
outsourcing as well as inter-firm relational exchange research as is evidenced from extant 
literature (Heidi, 1994; Hill, 1990; Mysen et al., 2010; Ono & Kubo, 2009; Stump & 
Heide, 1996; Wang, 2002) in these areas.  The basic premise of TCA is whether a 
particular transaction can be performed more efficiently within an organization or by 
outside firms (Geyskens et al., 2006), thereby rendering it relevant to the outsourcing 
phenomenon.  TCA’s two behavioral dimensions include bounded rationality and 
opportunism whereas its two transactional dimensions include asset specificity and 
uncertainty (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  
Bounded rationality is defined as constraints on decision-makers’ cognitive 
capabilities and limits on their rationality which in turn affect their information 
processing and communication abilities (Simon, 1957).  Within the context of 
outsourcing, bounded rationality is likely to limit the ability of a buyer to effectively 
evaluate a vendor a priori as well as assess its post-contractual performance.  
Opportunism is defined by Williamson (1985) as self-interest seeking with guile and can 
include behaviors such as lying, cheating, deceit, and violating agreements.     
Asset specificity refers to assets that are designed for a particular transaction and 
cannot be easily redeployed outside that relationship by either of the parties (Geyskens et 
al., 2006).  Asset specificity is also referred to as idiosyncratic or relationship-specific 
investments (Anderson & Weitz, 1992).  Williamson (1991) states that assets with a high 




transaction.  In inter-firm relationships such as outsourcing, asset specificity or 
relationship-specific investments increase dependence and eventually expose the buyer or 
the seller to the risk of opportunism (Heide, 1994).  Asset specificity, however, is studied 
as a control variable in this research given that it has already been shown to influence 
opportunism.   
Uncertainty, within the transaction cost literature, is defined along two 
dimensions, including environmental as well as behavioral uncertainty.  Environmental 
uncertainty involves changes in demand, supply, and technology whereas behavioral 
uncertainty reflects the inability of a buyer to accurately assess contractual compliance 
(Rindfleisch & Hiede, 1997).   Behavioral uncertainty is also termed as performance 
ambiguity by transaction cost researchers whereby a buyer is unable to assess whether the 
vendor or the supplier has performed according to the terms of the agreement (Ouchi, 
1979).  Behavioral uncertainty when combined with bounded rationality can create post-
contractual performance evaluation problems on the part of the buying firm (Stump & 
Heide, 1996).   
Transaction cost literature treats uncertainty as a transactional dimension (Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002; Wang, 2002) and higher environmental and behavioral uncertainty 
perceptions are generally cited as factors that influence an organization’s decision to 
vertically integrate as opposed to outsource (Geyskens et al., 2006).  This paper focuses 
on technological uncertainty (a form of environmental uncertainty) perceptions of the 
buyer as they relate to a priori evaluation of an outsourced service provider.  Given that 
behavioral uncertainty is a post-contractual phenomenon (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997), it, 




logical for buyers to rely on external cues in their outsourced services’ vendor evaluation 
and selection, once the decision to outsource has already been reached.  In that regard, 
bounded rationality likely increases the importance of vendor firm characteristics and 
how they influence buyers’ a priori or ex ante perceptions of opportunism and uncertainty 
associated with a particular vendor.   
Independent Variables - Vendor Firm Characteristics 
Vendor firm size. 
When purchasing outsourced services, the buying firms often have to choose from 
among small, medium, and large vendors that may offer comparable services and at 
comparable prices.  However, these vendors often vary in other facets of their operations 
such as geographic reach, customer support, and brand awareness.  Within the inter-firm 
or dyadic relations literature, firm size (both buyer and supplier) is deemed as a key 
variable of interest (Campbell, 1985; Redondo & Fiero, 2007) since it affects various 
aspects in a relational exchange such as trust (Doney & Cannon, 1997).   
The size of a seller or a buyer is also equated with the degree of power one 
exchange member will have over another (Anderson & Narus, 1990).  Within the 
transaction cost literature, dependence of one party in an exchange over the other is cited 
as a variable that exposes the dependent party to the risk of opportunism (Geyskens et al., 
2006; Nooteboom, 1993).  A small supplier, for instance, is likely to be more dependent 
on a larger buyer (Larson, Carr, & Dhariwal, 2005), specifically if the buyer accounts for 
a majority of the supplier’s business (Krause, Ragatz, & Hughley, 1999).  Under that 
scenario, a smaller supplier may often find it necessary to comply with the buyer’s 




when Walmart implemented the use of radio frequency identification systems to improve 
inventory control and management, smaller suppliers had two options, i.e., abandon the 
relationship with Walmart or absorb the high cost of deploying radio frequency 
identification systems.  Similar to this, Morgan (2000) found that small suppliers are 
reluctant to implement electronic data interchanges as they view these as more 
advantageous for their larger buyers.  
Conversely, a small buyer may have more dependence on a larger supplier and 
hence may be at a disadvantage when the supplier increases its prices.  For instance, an 
increase in micro-processor prices by Intel, a major component provider to the computing 
industry, is likely to have a greater negative impact on smaller computer manufacturers 
than larger ones.  Unlike smaller buyers that often buy small quantities, larger firms, by 
virtue of bulk buying, may be able to offset the effects of price increase through volume 
discounts. 
Vendor or supplier firm size is also equated with their capabilities, as indicated by 
Nooteboom (1993), positing that small firms lack economies of scale and are unable to 
allocate resources to expand their expertise.  With regard to outsourcing, a small vendor 
may find it difficult to offer around the clock customer support due to high costs of 
developing such capability as well as the reduced number of customers over which to 
spread costs.  Small suppliers may also find it difficult to develop frequent product 
updates or improvements due to their limited resources.   
Within the context of TCA, Nooteboom (1993) contends that smaller firms, 
buyers or sellers, not only experience higher transaction costs for themselves but also for 




a smaller supplier’s ability to offer lower prices for the products and services it provides 
to its organizational customers.  In addition, Dilts and Prough (1989) found that small 
firms not only face resource constraints but also lack managerial expertise.  In an IT 
outsourcing arrangement, lack of managerial expertise is likely to hinder the ability of a 
supplier to develop innovative services or effectively understand and comply with the 
product/service specifications required by its exchange partners.   
The definition of firm size remains rather convoluted given that it may be a 
function of the type of industry or a country in which a firm operates (D’Amboise & 
Muldowney, 1988; Nooteboom, 1993).  Within the U.S. market alone, there are a number 
of ways to define firm size, including number of employees, number of locations, and 
revenues.  For instance, Larson et al. (2005) defined small suppliers as those with fewer 
than 500 employees to study the use of electronic media and relational exchange within 
supply chain management.  Similarly, Carmel and Nicholson (2005) define a small firm 
based on the number of employees when examining offshore software outsourcing.  
Krause et al. (1999) define small and large suppliers in terms of annual sales generated by 
the supplier.  Further, Doney and Cannon (1997) asked buyers to classify their supplier as 
a large or small firm.  In essence, based on existing research discussed above, vendor 
firm size is a key variable that can impact a number of outcomes in an inter-firm 
relationship.  Moreover, vendor firm size also influences buyers’ perceptions of the 
capabilities of a vendor.        
Vendor reputation. 
Vendor reputation is described as a multi-faceted construct and involves aspects 




trustworthiness (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).  Doney and Cannon (1997) further classify 
reputation as the extent to which industry participants believe a supplier is not only 
honest but also concerned about its customers.  Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever 
(2005) argue that there are two distinct dimensions of reputation that include perceived 
quality and prominence.  The perceived quality aspect of reputation alludes to the extent 
to which stakeholders positively assess a particular organizational attribute or 
characteristic whereby the prominence part reflects the collective awareness and 
recognition of an organization by its various stakeholders (Rindova et al., 2005).  
Fombrun (1996, p. 165) states that reputation is a “perceptual representation of a 
company’s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s appeal to all of its 
key constituents.”  In that regard, while reputation is earned over a period of time, it can 
also change quickly based on the operational activities of an organization.  For instance, 
financial scandals of organizations such as Arthur Andersen, Enron, and others quickly 
tarnished their reputation in addition to incurring considerable legal problems.  Chun 
(2005) argues that organizational reputation is a multidimensional concept and should be 
measured as such and that a global measure of reputation may produce different results 
under different scenarios.  
Vendor reputation is a key variable in inter-firm relational exchanges as it is 
shown to influence important outcomes such as opportunism (Wang, 2002) and trust 
(Ganesan, 1994; Kwon, 2004).  From a relational exchange perspective, a supplier’s 
desire to protect its reputation serves as a deterrent against opportunism (Houston & 
Johnson, 2000).  Within the vendor selection literature, reputation is also positively 




Given the transaction cost assumption of bounded rationality whereby a buyer is 
unable to anticipate and incorporate all contingencies in a formal contract (Richmond et 
al., 1992), vendor reputation is likely to serve as a cue or signal to the buyer regarding the 
overall trustworthiness of a particular vendor (Sarkis & Talluri, 2002), specifically in the 
pre-contract or ex ante stage and in situations where a past relationship with the vendor is 
non-existent.  Since positive reputation increases buyers’ trust in a vendor (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997), the need for costly post-contractual (ex post) monitoring and 
management of a vendor is, therefore, minimized.  While both transaction cost and 
outsourcing researchers have evaluated the impact of reputation on variables such as 
outsourcing project success (Wang, 2002), the effects of vendor reputation on reducing 
buyers’ perceptions of uncertainty in an exchange have not been evaluated.  This paper 
specifically tests the influence of vendor reputation on reducing buyers’ perceptions of 
technological uncertainty involved in an outsourcing arrangement. 
Dependent Variables – Opportunism and Uncertainty 
Opportunism. 
Opportunism, is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975, p. 
6) and includes a variety of behaviors including lying, cheating, misleading, shirking, and 
deceit” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47).  Wathne and Hiede (2000, p. 38) state “what sets 
opportunism apart from the standard economic assumption of self-interest seeking 
behavior is the notion of guile.”  In their research, Wathne and Heide (2000) further 
classify opportunism as active or passive whereby active opportunism involves situations 
whereby a party to the exchange overtly engages in behaviors specifically forbidden in 




Opportunism is a key behavioral construct in TCA research and one that has been 
studied in inter-firm relationship literature (Jap & Anderson, 2003; Ring & Van De Ven, 
1992; Stump & Heide, 1996) as well as outsourcing (Parkhe, 1993).  Within the inter-
firm relational exchange literature, Hawkins et al. (2009) identify six antecedents of 
opportunism including dependency, formalization, centralization, control, uncertainty, 
and relational norms.  Within the outsourced manufacturing context, Parkhe (1993) found 
that perceptions of opportunistic behavior negatively influence performance of a strategic 
alliance, level of relationship-specific investments, and contractual safeguards.  In other 
words, as perceptions of opportunism increase, partners in an exchange are less inclined 
to invest in relationship-specific investments or perceive that the alliance has performed 
to its potential.  Similarly, Aubert, Patry, & Rivard (1998) suggest the likelihood of a 
buyer and or its supplier to default on the terms of the agreement is present in each 
outsourcing arrangement.  Given the assertion by Aubert et al. (1998), it is therefore 
necessary for both the buyer and the supplier to identify and understand the impact of 
various opportunism antecedents.  
Opportunism can be manifested in the ex ante (pre-contract) as well as ex post 
(post-contract) stages of a transaction.  For instance, in the pre-contract stage, a vendor 
may misrepresent information about its capabilities and resources (Williamson, 1985) 
while in the ex post stage a vendor may change product quality in order to reap better 
margins (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  In the ex ante stage, vendor opportunism and bounded 
rationality on the part of the buyer may lead to adverse selection, whereby the principal 
or the buyer cannot observe or verify the characteristics of the agent (Aubert et al., 1998), 




outsourcing context, includes behaviors such as quality shirking (Hadfield, 1990) or 
violation of contracts (Murry & Heide, 1998) and can come in the form of quality 
degradation, service debasement, and hidden costs (Aubert et al., 1998).  
Within the extant literature, a range of attributes or antecedents influence the 
presence and degree of opportunism.  These include lock-in arrangements or contracts 
(Dutta et al., 1995), idiosyncratic or relationship-specific investments also called asset 
specificity (Brown, Dev, & Dong-Jin, 2000), short-term orientation of the supplier 
(Larson et al., 2005), and dependence in terms of the availability and the number of 
alternative suppliers (Ganesan, 1994).  In addition, environmental and behavioral 
uncertainty is cited as a key condition that fosters opportunism in inter-firm relationships 
including outsourcing (Geyskens et al., 2006; Stump & Heide, 1996; Walker & Weber, 
1984).     
Overall, as discussed above, opportunism may exist in various forms in an inter-
firm relationship hence affecting a range of outcomes including costs and quality.  
Williamson (1996) contends that although strong governance mechanisms can limit the 
extent of ex post opportunism, such tools are unlikely to completely rid an inter-firm 
arrangement of the threat of post-contractual opportunism.  In order to constrain the 
incidence of ex post opportunism, it is important for a buying firm to study ex ante 
variables such as vendor firm characteristics that may affect the degree of ex post 
opportunism.  In that regard, this research focuses on buyers’ ex ante perceptions of 
opportunism related to a particular vendor.   
Uncertainty. 




transaction (as opposed to behavioral) dimension and involves the inability of the parties 
to anticipate all pertinent contingencies related to an exchange.  Moreover, uncertainty 
also refers to the incapability to evaluate performance in an inter-firm relationship 
(Geyskens et al., 2006).  Uncertainty, according to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), creates 
an adaptation problem in that contracts would have to be re-written or renegotiated if and 
when variations occur in the circumstances surrounding a buyer-seller exchange.  For 
instance, an electronic medical record application provider may develop product updates 
that can render the software incompatible with other billing and operational systems 
deployed by a hospital (the buyer).  Under such a scenario, the hospital may have limited 
choice but to either replace the application provider or pay for costly integration services 
that would make the new application compatible with legacy systems.  In essence, the 
inability to anticipate all contingencies due to the presence of bounded rationality renders 
all contracts as incomplete (Nooteboom, 1992).   
Scholars such as Klein (1989) argue that uncertainty is a broad concept that 
requires further refinement.  Klein (1989) classifies uncertainty along two dimensions; 
environmental and behavioral, whereby environmental uncertainty includes changes in 
demand/supply conditions as well as technological uncertainty while behavioral 
uncertainty involves problems in assessing whether a supplier has actually performed 
according to the terms laid out in the contract (Walker & Weber, 1989).  With regard to 
changes in demand and supply conditions, TCA scholars have largely equated this type of 
environmental uncertainty with the inability to accurately forecast volume or volume 
uncertainty in a buyer-seller exchange (Geyskens et al., 2006; Walker & Weber, 1984).  




volume uncertainty is excluded from this analysis.  This is consistent with other IT 
outsourcing studies that have not included volume uncertainty due to its lack of relevance 
to B2B services (Ang & Straub, 1998; Earl, 1996; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992; Wang, 
2002).    
The definition of technological uncertainty, which is a subset of environmental 
uncertainty, varies slightly among scholars.  For instance, Stump and Heide (1996) and 
Walker and Weber (1994) view it as difficulties in accurately forecasting the technical 
requirements in an exchange.  This is generally the case for many outsourced IT services 
whereby technical requirements often need revising several times over the course of the 
project.  In addition to the difficulties associated with defining technological 
specifications within an outsourced project, Stump and Heidi (1996) as well as McNally 
and Griffin (2004) further equate technological uncertainty with the risk of technology 
obsolescence.  Quinn and Hilmer (1994) contend that technological uncertainty is 
reflected by higher frequency of technical change, rising intricacies in product 
architecture, and the threat of obsolescence.   
Technological obsolescence, within IT services, typically occurs when a 
provider’s solution becomes incompatible with other applications or hardware after it has 
been deployed.  For instance, an electronic medical record application by a vendor may 
become technologically obsolete if the vendor does not continue to invest in product 
development and support activities thereby forcing a hospital or a physician’s office to 
incur replacement costs.  Given the focus of this paper is on outsourced IT services, only 
technological uncertainty is included in the overall research model and analysis.   




assessing a supplier’s post-contractual performance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  Behavioral 
uncertainty is specifically an issue that stems from the intangibility characteristic of 
services that makes accurate performance evaluation rather difficult, if not impossible 
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).  Behavioral uncertainty can come into play in a 
variety of outsourcing arrangements.  For instance, complex products and services 
purchased by an organization can render it difficult for a buyer to accurately evaluate a 
supplier’s capability ex ante or its ex post performance (Cannon & Perreault, 1999).  
Moreover, in new buy situations that generally suffer from lack of past experience with a 
vendor or a product/service, it may be difficult for the buyer to determine whether the 
vendor or the supplier has actually performed according to the letter and the spirit of the 
contract. 
In addition to the intricacies involved in evaluating quality, monitoring is also 
likely to be more complex in a services environment (Hawkins et al., 2009).  As an 
illustration, when marketing outsourced data storage services, vendors often provide 
organizational buyers with the option to subscribe to shared or dedicated storage servers.  
However, even when a customer chooses dedicated storage servers, it is rather difficult, if 
not impossible, for the buyer to verify whether the server that hosts their data is in fact 
one-hundred percent dedicated, unless the server resides at the buyer’s premises.  The 
same applies to the provision of dedicated customer support to a corporate client.   
While the inclusion of uncertainty in outsourcing arrangements as well as other 
inter-firm relationships has been well-documented in literature (Anderson, 1985; Bucklin 
& Sengupta, 1993; Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995; Heide & John, 1990), 




instance, in their study of manufacturers of industrial products found a positive 
relationship between environmental and behavioral uncertainty and a manufacturer’s 
degree of forward integration into the distribution channels.  Similarly, Weiss and 
Anderson (1992) found that behavioral uncertainty is positively related to a 
manufacturer’s intention to use a direct sales force as opposed to other intermediary-
dependent distribution and sales arrangements.  Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) in 
their study of manufacturing industries found that technological obsolescence, which is 
part of environmental uncertainty, negatively influences the likelihood for vertical 
integration.  In other words, the higher the degree of technological obsolescence, the less 
likely a firm is to invest in vertical integration. 
It should be noted here that technological uncertainty is cited as a condition that 
discourages vertical integration or in-house development of products and services 
(Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Geyskens et al., 2006).  On the contrary, behavioral 
uncertainty has been shown as a factor that encourages hierarchy or in-house 
development over market or outsourced arrangements (Heide & John, 1990; Weiss & 
Anderson, 1992).  This renders technological uncertainty as a more pertinent construct 
when evaluating outsourced service providers.  Stated otherwise, while technological 
uncertainty can be aligned with a vendor, behavioral uncertainty is more likely aligned 
with the characteristics of a transaction or purchase (Cannon & Perreault, 1999) as 
opposed to a particular vendor.  In addition, behavioral uncertainty or performance 
evaluation issues are likely more inherent across a broad spectrum of services 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985) regardless of the type of vendor used, thereby further limiting 




is more closely associated with post-contractual performance evaluation issues 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) hence accounting for its omission from this paper.  
Hypotheses Development 
Vendor Firm Characteristics and Buyers’ Perceptions of Opportunism and Uncertainty 
Vendor firm size, opportunism, and technological uncertainty. 
With regard to opportunism, Barney (1990) contends that it is difficult to 
determine a party’s opportunistic behavior a priori.  This is likely more so in the case of 
outsourcing arrangements whereby an organization may not have past experience with a 
vendor, hence relying on cues such as vendor firm size to evaluate a vendor’s 
capabilities.  In addition, the presence of bounded rationality further increases the 
importance of external cues such as firm size when evaluating a vendor for outsourcing.   
Doney and Cannon (1997) argue that buyers can use a transference process, 
through which they may rely on the experiences of others, to determine the 
trustworthiness of a supplier based on its firm size.  In that regard, vendor firm size can 
offer a buyer several insights into a supplier.  Small firms, for instance, typically have 
limited resources including research budgets as well as managerial capabilities (Carmel 
& Nicholson, 2005), which renders them at a disadvantage in terms of investments in 
research and development as well as other operational functions such as customer 
support.  The fact that smaller firms are unable to rely on economies of scale 
(Feigenbaum & Karnani, 1991) can have an impact on a supplier’s internal costs as well 
as its pricing strategies.  For instance, smaller advertising agencies are likely to pay 
higher rates when purchasing media compared to large firms that are not only able to 




clients thereby keeping their rates low for individual clients.   
Dean, Brown, & Bamford (1998) state that small firms face limitations in raising 
financial resources compared to large firms.  In the context of outsourcing, lack of 
financial resources can impact the ability of a vendor to expand and or upgrade its 
facilities, such as customer support, in order to meet the growing needs of its customers.  
Furthermore, Larson et al. (2005) state that small firms, due to their limited resources, are 
more likely to focus on short-term gains and benefits.  Short-term orientation or the focus 
on short-term gains by an economic actor is cited as a condition that serves as an 
antecedent or precursor to opportunism while long-term orientation suppresses 
opportunism (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Hill, 1990).   
Doney and Cannon (1997, p. 38) state that “supplier size provides a signal to the 
buying firm that the selling firm can be trusted,” given that larger vendors often have 
larger market shares thereby reflecting that many buyers trust the seller.  In situations 
where a buyer may not have a past relationship with a particular vendor, supplier firm 
size serves as a basis for “transferring trust to unknown or untried suppliers, relying on 
the experience of others,” (Doney & Cannon, 1997, p. 47).  With regard to smaller firms, 
their lower market share or fewer customers as well as their private ownership structure is 
also likely to render it difficult for buyers to cost-effectively verify the vendors’ 
capabilities a priori.  Similarly, within the ex post stage, resource constraints faced by 
smaller vendors may, for instance, prevent them from expanding their customer support 
staff in order to meet the needs of their growing customer base.  
Within an outsourcing context, therefore, a smaller supplier due to its focus on 




on a contract.  Moreover, a smaller vendor is also likely to engage in post contractual 
shirking (such as service quality debasement) due to its limited resources thereby leading 
to the following hypothesis:    
H1: Vendor firm size is negatively related to buyer’s perceptions of opportunism.  
From a technological uncertainty perspective, small vendors, due to their limited 
financial resources (Dean et al., 1998) as well as lack of expertise (Dilts & Prough, 1989) 
are likely to face a higher degree of technological uncertainty.  Such uncertainty may 
revolve around their inability to make frequent product improvements.  In a study of 
small minority suppliers, Krause et al. (1999) found that smaller suppliers indicated that 
their firms were frequently undercapitalized.  Lack of access to capital can impair a 
firm’s ability to undertake necessary investments in improving its products/services as 
well as expanding its facilities.  Monteverde and Teece (1982) argue that in many buyer-
seller exchanges, technology requirements are likely to continue to evolve and it is often 
difficult to specify such requirements ex ante.  Therefore, a vendor that lacks in 
economies of scale, scope, experience, and learning is less likely to make cost-effective 
adaptations to the changing needs of the relationship (Nooteboom, 1992). 
Larson et al. (2005) contend that despite the declining costs of technology, 
investments in new systems remain cost-prohibitive for small firms.  Specifically in 
industries such as healthcare, telecommunications, and information technology where 
technological requirements are constantly changing, a small supplier may find it cost-
prohibitive to make changes in product architecture on a routine basis.  Within the 
healthcare services industry, for instance, hospital information systems remain in a state 




to comply with the changing regulatory environment.  For a smaller provider of 
electronic medical record systems, they may have to make several updates to their 
product in order to keep it compatible with other software and applications being 
deployed by a hospital.  Lack of economies of scale (Nooteboom, 1992) plus capital 
constraints on the part of smaller vendors render it difficult for them to develop 
continuous updates to their systems thereby exposing them to technology obsolescence. 
In addition to capital constraints, Larson et al. (2005) also cite that smaller firms 
generally lack internal expertise to keep pace with the technological changes.  Similarly, 
Chen, Paulraj, & Lado (2004) found that in addition to high cost of technology, lack of 
technological know-how served as main barriers to e-commerce adoption among small 
and medium-sized enterprises.  Paulraj and Chen (2007) in their study of environmental 
uncertainty and strategic supply management use measures of technological uncertainty 
that establish linkages between the need to keep up with technology changes and firm 
competitiveness.  While Teece (1996) acknowledged that firms can add new capabilities, 
they also state that the process is time-intensive and also costly hence leading to the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: Vendor firm size is negatively related to buyers’ perceptions of technological 
uncertainty.   
Vendor reputation, opportunism, and technological uncertainty. 
  Reputation is defined as a multi-faceted construct that involves perceptions of 
fairness (Ganesan, 1994), credibility (Kwon & Suh, 2004), reliability (Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988), and trustworthiness (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).  As discussed above, 




scholars such as Kwon and Suh (2004) have studied its impact on constructs such as 
inter-organizational trust and commitment.  Still others such as Houston and Johnson 
(2000) have examined the influence of vendor reputation on curbing opportunistic 
behavior in a buyer-seller exchange.  Vendors with a superior reputation are perceived as 
attractive exchange partners (Dyer, 1996) as reputation signals the trustworthiness of a 
supplier.   
With regard to linkages between reputation and opportunism, Garvey (1995) 
contends that as vendor reputation increases, there will be a lesser need for the buyer to 
engage in costly integration activities with its supplier.  Greater integration into a 
supplier’s processes provides the buying firm with greater visibility into supplier 
performance.  For suppliers with weaker reputation, a buyer may not only employ 
alternative governance mechanisms but also require such vendors to make relationship-
specific investments (Houston & Johnson, 2000).  Hennart (1993) argues that reputation 
constrains opportunistic behavior on the part of the supplier as such behavior would lead 
a supplier to lose credibility and hence its ability to win future business in the 
marketplace.  Positive reputation is also viewed as an asset by scholars such as Dasgupta 
(1988) in that it shows that a firm has made significant investments in earning such 
reputation and hence is less likely to jeopardize it by acting opportunistically. 
The importance of vendor reputation cannot be underemphasized within the 
context of B2B services, many of which suffer from performance evaluation 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985) as well as monitoring (Hawkins et al., 2009) difficulties.  Also, 
given that most inter-firm contracts are deemed incomplete (Williamson, 1985), positive 




inclined to act opportunistically ex post thereby leading to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Vendor firm reputation is negatively related to buyers’ perceptions of 
opportunism. 
With regard to linkages between vendor firm reputation and technological 
uncertainty, positive reputation not only conveys a sense of credibility and fairness 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Ganesan, 1994) to the buyers but also increases their trust in a 
vendor (Kwon, 2004).  Provided that reputation is generally earned over a period of time 
and requires significant investments in a range of operational areas (Dasgupta, 1988), it is 
also likely to provide buyers with insights into the ability of a vendor to sustain 
investments in product/service development and improvement.  For instance, within the 
outsourced IT services market, vendors such as IBM, Oracle, SAP, and Microsoft have, 
over the past several decades, built a reputation for offering innovative solutions to their 
customers.  Their positive reputations for superior technological know-how in the 
marketplace can be evidenced from their large market shares in a multitude of B2B IT 
services markets.  As suggested by Hill (1990), suppliers that are perceived as less 
trustworthy (i.e., those with less favorable reputations) are unable to garner larger sales or 
market shares hence establishing a linkage between market share and reputation.   
When seeking a new outsourced IT solution such as data analytics, many buyers 
such as healthcare services providers (hospitals) are choosing to outsource such solutions 
from vendors such as IBM that have a strong reputation in the marketplace as compared 
to smaller vendors.  Given the extensive scale and scope of their operations, IT solutions 
from vendors such as IBM are less likely to face the risk of technological obsolescence 




resources (Nooteboom, 1992), and fewer customers.  Hoetker (2005, p. 78) in his 
research on supplier selection for technically innovative component argues that “potential 
suppliers differ in their technical capabilities and, thus, in their ability to produce a 
component according to the desired specifications and schedule.”  A supplier’s reputation 
can, therefore, signal to the potential buyer whether a vendor is capable of developing a 
technologically sophisticated product or service as well as its ability to sustain such a 
solution.  Moreover, in complex purchase situations that render it difficult for a buyer to 
accurately specify all technical requirements ex ante (Richmond et al., 1992), vendors 
with a strong reputation for technical know-how are able to help buyers develop such 
specifications.    
H4: Vendor firm reputation is negatively related to buyer’s perceptions of 
technological uncertainty.  
The linkages between environmental uncertainty (including technological 
uncertainty) and opportunism are well established across extant TCA literature (Joshi & 
Stump, 1999; McNally & Griffin, 2004; Mysen et al., 2010; Williamson, 1985).  
Rindflesich and Heide (1997), for instance, contend that environmental uncertainty 
creates adaptation problems in that it may require the parties in an exchange to modify 
existing contracts in order to fit the changing circumstances (Williamson, 1985).  
Contractual renegotiation is likely a costly undertaking and one that can be used to gain 
concessions by an exchange partner (Hawkins et al., 2009).  Crosno and Dahlstrom 
(2008) argue that environmental uncertainty along with inability to predict an exchange 
partner’s behavior lead to a higher likelihood of opportunism.  Moreover, Skarmeas, 




higher information asymmetry between the buyer and the supplier and may drive a 
supplier to engage in opportunistic behavior. 
  Given the high rate of technical change in IT outsourcing arrangements (Bahli & 
Rivard, 2003; Wang, 2002), the advent of new technologies can render existing solutions 
either obsolete or incompatible.  Such circumstances can essentially force exchange 
partners to renegotiate contracts in order to meet changing technological needs (Earl, 
1996).  Within the network access services market, for instance, there is a constant flux of 
new fiber-based transport technologies that are capable of delivering multiple services 
(voice, data, and video) over a single platform thereby rendering existing copper-based 
solutions rather obsolete.  From a buyer’s perspective, as availability of fiber-based 
technologies increases, they may find themselves either having to seek new providers or 
renegotiate contracts with existing suppliers for migration of their voice, data, and video 
traffic over new network facilities.  In either of these situations, buyers are likely to face 
the risk of vendor opportunism in that the existing provider may not wish to terminate the 
relationship without charging significant termination fees or charging higher than market 
prices.  Higher degree of uncertainty that requires renegotiation of existing agreements is 
cited as a condition that fosters opportunistic behavior on the part of certain economic 
actors (Williamson, 1985) thereby leading to the following hypothesis: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between buyers’ perceptions of technological 
uncertainty and vendor opportunism. 
Control Variables 
A number of control variables must be considered in this study.  Specifically, 




shown to influence perceptions of opportunism and uncertainty, and will therefore be 
examined.  With regard to buyer firm size, Nooteboom (1992) states that both buyer and 
supplier firm size influence the perceptions of dependency in an exchange.  Smaller or 
larger buyer size is also cited as a determinant of higher or lower power-dependency on 
the part of the buyer (Anderson & Naurus, 1990; Kim, 2000).  For instance, if a buyer 
accounts for a large portion of a supplier’s overall revenues, the supplier is generally 
more dependent on the buyer and vice versa.  While the sources of dependency in a 
buyer-seller relationship vary, it is cited as a key variable that can expose the dependent 
party to the risk of opportunism (Williamson, 1985).   
Similarly, Larson et al. (2005) contend that larger buyers are more inclined to 
develop long-term relational exchange with larger suppliers due to the reason that smaller 
vendors are viewed as having short-term orientation.  The perception of short-term 
supplier orientation on the part of the buyer can influence the ability of these vendors to 
attract more interest from among larger buyers.  Homer (1985, p. 57) states that “a small 
buyer is likely to be more sympathetic to small business vendors due to awareness of the 
challenges faced by small business people.”  Within the context of outsourced IT 
services, larger buyers with more complex needs are likely to perceive greater uncertainty 
with regard to the ability of a smaller vendor to adequately fulfill their needs across a 
broad range of geographic locations.  Various scholars have generally measured in terms 
of the number of employees or the annual revenues (Krause et al., 1999; Larson et al., 
2005).  
Idiosyncratic investments or relationship-specific investments, also termed as 




that are employed for a particular exchange and have little if any residual value outside 
that exchange.  Jap and Anderson (2003) contend that while ex ante relationship-specific 
investments by both buyers and suppliers are designed to reduce the perception of 
opportunism, such investments can also lead to greater dependency on the exchange 
partner as circumstances surrounding a transaction alter.  Heide (1994) contends that 
relationship-specific investments lead to dependence and hence increase the risk of 
opportunistic behavior on the part of exchange members.  From a buyer’s perspective, the 
willingness of the supplier to invest in relationship-specific investments can also indicate 
to the buyer that a supplier can be trusted (Ganesan, 1994) thereby reducing buyer’s 
perceptions of vendor opportunism.  With regard to uncertainty, idiosyncratic 
investments influence buyers’ concerns about environmental and behavioral uncertainty 
related to a particular transaction or a supplier.    
Information sharing/exchange is defined by Cannon and Perreault (1999, p. 441) 
as “expectations of open sharing of information” on the part of both the buyer and the 
seller.  Such information sharing is expected to benefit both parties in an exchange.  Open 
channels of communication as well as effective exchange of information from the vendor 
provide buyers with insights into a supplier’s future plans (Cannon & Homburg, 2001).  
Such insights can then enable buyers to adjust their internal operational needs and 
processes.  Lack of information exchange as well as the absence of effective vendor 
monitoring may lead to greater information asymmetry among buyers and sellers.   
Information asymmetry, whereby one party in an exchange has more information 
than the other, is cited as a condition that fosters opportunistic behavior in a principal-




information provides the buyer (principal) with knowledge of the supplier’s (agent) 
activities hence reducing the need for costly monitoring.  Information sharing also 
reduces uncertainty about the exchange outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).  Cannon and 
Perreault (1999) further argue that sharing of confidential information may be deemed as 
a sign of trust thereby leading to greater relationship commitment.  In essence, 
information sharing by the supplier or vendor assists buyers in their monitoring of a 
vendor’s behavior.  In addition, open sharing of information is also likely to reduce 
buyer’s anxieties with regard to a vendor’s future actions.  
Methodology 
Sample 
The sample for the current research was based on an online panel of 
organizational buyers responsible for IT procurement (including outsourced IT services 
such as cloud computing, network security, data center services, etc.) for their respective 
organizations.  Studies have utilized online panels (e.g., Wolfinbarger & Gilley, 2003; 
Hansen, Møller Jensen, & Stubbe Solgaard, 2004; Duffy, Smith, Terhanian, & Bremer, 
2005).  Moreover, Skinner, Autry, & Lamb (2009, p. 233) state “research on panels is 
beginning to indicate that the use of predetermined respondents does not lead to negative 
or biased results, and results from panel surveys do not differ significantly from those 
collected through random mail samples, provided that the target population holds the 
requisite competencies needed for effective response.”  Similarly, Dennis (2001) 
conducted a variety of online panel-based studies and did not find any negative impacts 
in the results that could be attributed to the use of a panel.  




Zikmund and Babin (2010) and Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson (2010) for cross-
sectional and or longitudinal studies.   Zikmund and Babin (2010) state that the utility of 
a panel resides in its ability to screen-out respondents that do not fit the required sample 
profile or those that are not representative of the population of interest.  Still others such 
as Evans and Mathur (2005) cite the value-added capabilities of online panels in terms of 
access to a large population from which to recruit respondents for B2B and B2C research.   
With regard to the respondent profile, use of organizational IT buyers is 
consistent with existing research on outsourcing as well as transaction cost analysis 
(Huber & Power, 1985; Wang, 2002; Whitten & Leidner, 2006).  Wang (2002), for 
instance, utilized a sample of 163 chief information officers from a range of industries 
including manufacturing, services, and the financial sector in studying the impact of 
transaction attributes on outsourcing success.  Similarly, in their research on IT vendor 
switching behavior, Whitten and Leidner (2006) surveyed 160 IT executives across 
multiple industries.  This paper utilized a similar approach as the above cited research 
studies in identifying survey respondents.   
As part of the screening process, respondents were asked to identify whether they 
are involved with their organization’s IT outsourcing purchase process, whether they had 
been involved in an IT outsourcing purchase decision within the past twelve months, and 
their level of involvement/role in the IT procurement process.  The respondents that 
cleared the screening questions were then asked to identify the type of IT solution that 
their organization outsourced, number of vendors evaluated, and names of vendors that 
were selected as well as of those that were not selected.  The respondents were then asked 




they had evaluated but not selected, and answer a series of questions pertaining to that 
vendor.  
Data Collection Procedures 
The data collection process was initiated with direct email invites sent by the 
online panel provider to its members requesting them to complete the survey.  A total of 
1,478 respondents involved in IT purchase decision-making were contacted by the third-
party online panel provider via an email invite.  Data was collected in three phases.  The 
first phase involved a soft launch of the survey.  During this stage, lasting 5 days, a total 
of 66 responses were collected and analyzed for response validity to the survey items.  
The second phase involved a full-launch of the survey that lasted another week and 
pushed the total number of completed surveys to 220.  A third round was initiated a week 
later that included direct email reminders to survey panel members.  At the end of the 
third phase, a total of 301 completed surveys were received.  Data from all three stages 
was compared to examine any differences in responses as per Armstrong and Overton 
(1977).  No significant differences in responses were found for the three stages in the data 
collection phase.  
Sample Profile 
Of the 1,478 respondents that were contacted via email, a total of 301 completed 
surveys were received yielding a 20.4 percent response rate.  The average survey 
completion time was measured at ten minutes.  The 301 completed surveys were 
examined for missing data, response accuracy, outliers, and other issues which led to 
further reduction in the number of respondents.  In terms of response inaccuracy, 




they evaluated, those that had been on their job for less than one year, had less than one 
year of IT procurement experience were removed from the final analysis.  In addition, 
respondents whose procurement responsibility was below $1,000/year, whose 
organizations had fewer than five employees, whose company annual revenues were 
below $10,000, whose overall company IT budget was less than $1,000, and who had 
below one percent of their total IT budget dedicated to outsourcing were also eliminated.  
Thus, leaving 203 valid completes and an effective usable response rate of 13.7 percent.   
The sample size of 203 is within the guidelines provided by Hair et al. (2010) for 
research models with seven or fewer constructs.  All usable respondents indicated that 
they had been involved in an IT outsourcing decision within the past twelve months and 
while 72.4 percent identified themselves as having the final purchase authority, 27.6 
percent stated that they recommend or influence their organization’s IT procurement 
decisions.  Table 2.1 provides a summary of respondents’ characteristics. 
Table 2.1: Respondent Profile 
Male 66% 
Female 34% 
Number of Years Employed with their Current Organization (median) 7 
Number of Years in IT Procurement (median) 10 
Respondents’ Annual IT Procurement Responsibility (median)   $400,000 
Number of Employees in the Firm (median) 530 
Annual Revenues of the Firm (median) $34 million 
Annual IT Budget of the Firm (median) $750,000 
Percent of Total IT Budget Dedicated to Outsourcing (median) 25% 
  
With regard to industry affiliation, 24.6 percent of respondents were involved in 
manufacturing, 7.9 percent in construction and professional services respectively, 6.9 
percent in retail trade, 4.4 percent each in telecommunications and educational services, 




individual industry accounted for over 4 percent of total respondents.   
Measures 
The survey items were adapted from established scales for the measurement of 
vendor firm size, vendor reputation, buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism, and 
technological uncertainty to fit within an ex ante context.  The multi-faceted vendor 
reputation scale included eleven items (anchors: strongly disagree/strongly agree) to 
study buyer’s perceptions of vendor reputation with regard to fairness/honesty, 
product/service quality, and vision/leadership.  Four items were adapted from Ganesan 
(1994) to measure the perceived fairness and honesty aspects of reputation (e.g., this 
vendor has a reputation for being honest; most buyers think that this vendor has a 
reputation for being fair).  Another seven items were adapted from the Reputation 
Quotient (RQ) developed by Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever (2000), Chun (2005), and 
Caruana (1997).  These include four items that measure reputation for product/service 
quality (e.g. this vendor offers high quality products and services; this vendor develops 
innovative products and services) as well as three items for vision and leadership (e.g. 
this vendor has a clear vision for its future; this vendor has excellent leadership).   
Vendor size was measured using a five-item seven point Likert-type scale 
(anchors: strongly disagree/strongly agree) developed by Doney and Cannon (1997) that 
asked respondents to identify who their supplier was and whether they considered their 
supplier a large or small company (e.g., this vendor is a very large company; this vendor 
is the industry’s biggest vendor of this outsourced solution).   
Vendor opportunism was measured using six items adapted from Rokkan, Heide, 




statements reflected an inaccurate/accurate description of how they felt about the vendor 
during the evaluation process (e.g., on occasion this vendor would have lied about certain 
things in order to protect their interests; this vendor would have promised to do things 
without actually doing them later).  Vendor technological uncertainty was measured 
using items adapted from Stump and Heide (1996).  The four-item scale asked 
respondents to classify the extent to which they perceived predictability/unpredictability 
with the vendor’s technology as well as the outsourced solution itself. 
Three control variables including buyer size, vendor idiosyncratic investments, 
and information sharing by the vendor were measured in this research.  Buyer size was 
measured by asking respondents to estimate the number of employees in their 
organization.  This is consistent with other research such as Larson et al. (2005) that used 
number of employees to determine size of the supplier firm.  Idiosyncratic or 
relationship-specific investments was measured via a five-item, seven point Likert-type 
scale used by Anderson and Weitz (1992), which asked respondents to express their level 
of disagreement/agreement with various statements pertaining to the willingness of the 
vendor to make relationship-specific investment.  Information sharing was measured by a 
five-item scale that included two items from Doney and Cannon (1997) and three items 
from Pesamaa and Hair (2007). 
Research Technique/Data Analysis 
This paper utilized structural equation modeling (SEM) to assess the impact of 
vendor firm characteristics on buyers’ perceptions of opportunism and technological 
uncertainty associated with the vendor.  In conducting data analysis, IBM’s SPSS as well 




consistent with other B2B research studies including Heide and John (1992), Heide and 
Miner (1992), and Doney and Cannon (1997). 
Results 
Measurement Model Results 
The measurement model which included seven constructs and 36 items was 
tested.  In addition, a reliability analysis was run to evaluate the consistency of all scales.  
The initial Cronbach’s alpha was used to identify items with low reliability scores.  The 
vendor size scale included a reverse-coded item (this vendor is a small player in the 
market), the reliability analysis revealed that deletion of the said item would enhance the 
scale reliability to 0.895 and was dropped. 
Common Method Variance (CMV) 
After performing scale reliability, all the constructs were tested for common 
method variance.  Common method variance, defined by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, (2003, p. 879) as “the amount of variance that is attributable to the 
measurement method rather than to the constructs that the measures represent,” may be 
an issue given this research relies on buyers’ self-reported perceptions of the various 
constructs examined.  While common method variance or common method bias is a valid 
issue, “the amount of variance attributable to method bias varies considerably by 
discipline and by the type of construct being investigated” as described by Podsakoff et 
al. (2003, p. 880).  In a meta-analysis of studies across a variety of disciplines, Cote and 
Buckley (1987) found that, on average, common method variance was the lowest in the 
marketing area.   




and Organ (1986) were used in identifying and addressing such concerns.  From a 
procedural perspective, this paper utilized scales that had varying anchors (such as 
strongly disagree/agree, predictable/unpredictable) to address CMV.  Marker variables 
(Williams, Hartman, & Cavazotte, 2010) were used at the mid-point in the survey.  In 
addition, a one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) was performed on the summated 
scales for each construct (including control variables) which revealed multiple factors.          
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
An initial confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to test the fit of each 
survey item with the constructs it represents using guidelines provided by Hair et al. 
(2010, p. 659) which call for assessing a model’s fit by evaluating the Chi-Square (the 
difference between observed and estimated covariance matrices) and the associated 
degrees of freedom (p-value below .05), RMSEA (values between .03 and .08), and 
incremental fit index such as CFI (values above 0.90) or TLI (values closer to 1).  The 
initial CFA results offered adequate fit (Chi-Square = 1208.99; DF = 574; CMIN/DF = 
2.106; CFI = 0.908; TLI = 0.899; RMSEA = .074) based on the framework provided by 
Hair et al. (2010), Hu and Bentler (1999), Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), and Wheaton et 
al. (1977). 
Subsequently, a review of modification indices was done which identified further 
opportunities to improve the GOF by eliminating items that either had higher 
unstandardized regression weights (values greater than 10) and also by reviewing 
standardized residual covariances for values greater than |4| as suggested by Hair et al. 
(2010).  With the deletion of each item, the measurement model was run again to 




a total of 28 items were used in the final model.  Table 2.2 provides the reliability, means, 
and standard deviations for each of the construct scales in the final measurement model. 
The results of the final measurement model suggested good model fit (Chi-Square = 
583.671; DF = 330; CMIN/DF = 1.769; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.943; RMSEA = 0.062).  
Table 2.2: Scale Reliability Results 
Construct Reliability (α) Mean Std. Deviation 
Vendor Size  
(4 items) 
0.895 5.088 1.342 
Vendor Reputation 
(7 items) 
0.934 5.416 0.995 
Perceived Opportunism  
(6 items) 
0.971 3.617 1.974 
Perceived Technological 
Uncertainty (4 items) 
0.910 3.858 1.386 
Idiosyncratic Investments by 
Vendor – control (3 items) 
0.895 4.827 1.356 
Information Sharing by 
Vendor – control  (3 items) 
0.915 4.277 1.724 
Note: Buyer size, the third control variable, is excluded from the table given that it was measured using a 
single item variable (number of employees). 
 
Next, each construct was examined for convergent and discriminant validity.  
With regard to convergent validity, all constructs had an average variance extracted 
(AVE) score above 0.50, all Eigenvalues higher than 1, and all reliability scores above 
the 0.70 threshold provided by Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips (1991) as well as Hair et al. 
(2010).  The results of convergent validity are presented in Table 2.3.  With regard to 
discriminant validity, the AVE scores for each construct must be higher than the squared 
inter-construct correlations to establish discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; 
Hair et al., 2010) and these results are presented in Table 2.4.  All constructs exhibit 












Vendor Size (4 items) 0.687 2.746 
Vendor Reputation (7 items) 0.673 4.711 
Perceived Opportunism (6 items) 0.849 5.092 
Perceived Technological Uncertainty (4 items) 0.720 2.878 
Idiosyncratic Investments by Vendor – control (3 items) 0.747 2.240 
Information Sharing by Vendor – control  (3 items) 0.788 2.365 
Note: Buyer size, the third control variable, is excluded from the table given that it was measured using a 
single item variable (number of employees). 
 
Table 2.4: Discriminant Validity Results 
 SZ REP OPP TU IDV ISV 
Squared Inter-
construct Correlations 
      
SZ 1      
REP 0.231 1     
OPP 0.075 0.011 1    
TU 0.004 0.005 0.247 1   
IDV 0.106 0.317 0.050 0.012 1  
ISV 0.055 0.104 0.206 0.078 0.539 1 
SZ = Vendor size; REP = Vendor reputation; OPP = Perceived opportunism; TU = Perceived 
technological uncertainty; IDV = Idiosyncratic investments by vendor; ISV = Information sharing by 
vendor 
 
Structural Model Results 
Based on the adequacy of the CFA results, a structural equation model (SEM) was 
then performed.  The structural model results were acceptable (Chi-Square = 695.587; DF 
= 337; CMIN/DF = 2.064; CFI = 0.929; TLI = 0.92; RMSEA = 0.073).    After having 
established the adequacy of SEM, a test of the hypotheses was then conducted. Results 
are detailed in the next section.  Control variables were examined for significant linkages.  




perceptions of opportunism (p. <.01) and technological uncertainty (p. <.01).   
Results of Hypotheses Testing 
   Results for H1, which links vendor firm size negatively to buyer’s perceptions 
of opportunism, failed to receive support. The link was significant in the opposite 
direction yielding a beta of 0.446 (p. <.05).  These results, while failing to provide 
support for the hypothesis, however, do indicate the presence of a strong positive 
relationship in the opposite direction between vendor size and buyers’ perceptions of 
opportunism.   
Results for H2, which links vendor firm size negatively to buyer’s perceptions of 
technological uncertainty, yielded a non-significant beta (p. >.05).  These results fail to 
provide support for H2.  Results for H3, which negatively links vendor firm reputation to 
buyer’s perceptions of opportunism, yielded a significant beta of -0.701 (p. <.05).  The 
results support H3.   
Results for H4, which links vendor firm reputation negatively to buyer’s 
perceptions of technological uncertainty, yielded a significant beta of -0.268 (p. <.05).  
Results provide support for H4.  Results for H5, which positively links buyer’s 
perceptions of technological uncertainty to vendor opportunism, yielded a significant beta 
















H1: Vendor firm size is negatively related to 
buyer’s perceptions of opportunism. 
0.446 Not Supported 
H2: Vendor firm size is negatively related to 
buyers’ perceptions of technological 
uncertainty.   
0.083 Not Supported 
H3: Vendor firm reputation is negatively related 
to buyers’ perceptions of opportunism. 
-0.701 Supported 
H4: Vendor firm reputation is negatively related 
to buyer’s perceptions of technological 
uncertainty. 
-0.268 Supported 
H5: There is a positive relationship between 
buyers’ perceptions of technological uncertainty 
and vendor opportunism. 
0.478 Supported 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Model 
The results of the structural model paths yielded weak to moderate squared 
multiple correlations for each of the predicted constructs.  The predicted variable 
perceived opportunism yielded an R
2 
of 0.55. The predicted variable perceived 
technological uncertainty yielded a R
2
 of 0.15.   
Discussion and Implications 
Vendor Firm Size and Perceptions of Opportunism  
  Despite the lack of support for H1, which negatively links vendor size to buyers’ 
perception of opportunism, the findings offer a valuable insights in that buyers of 
outsourced IT perceive a greater sense of opportunism from larger vendors than smaller 
firms offering such solutions.  One potential explanation here, as suggested by Ganesan 
(1994) and Geyskens et al. (2006) is that buyers may perceive a greater sense of 
dependence on larger vendors thereby essentially creating barriers to exit the relationship. 




over another (Anderson & Narus, 1990).  In that regard, buyers may perceive a lack of 
power when purchasing outsourced IT solutions/services from national and global 
vendors.  Regardless of the antecedents of dependence (such as supply constraints, 
channel member power, etc.), buyer-seller relationship research positively links 
dependence with opportunism (Heide, 1994).   
From a managerial perspective, while larger vendors may have a better reputation 
as suggested by Doney and Cannon (1997), ex ante perceptions of opportunism on the 
part of the buyer, as shown in this paper, may negatively impact their evaluation and 
selection by organizational IT buyers.  Keeping in consideration the findings of this 
research, large vendors must engage in branding strategies that alleviate opportunism 
perceptions of B2B IT buyers.  For instance, large vendors can focus on enhancing their 
sales and customer support functions in a way that conveys greater empathy for the 
customer.  Moreover, large vendors must also improve their level of responsiveness to 
customer problems, specifically smaller buyers that may often feel neglected by the 
larger vendor.   
Previous research conducted by Nooteboom (1993) shows that unlike large 
vendors, smaller vendors are often able to deliver personalized service to their customers 
thereby further supporting the positive linkage between vendor size and buyer’s 
perceptions of opportunism in the ex ante vendor evaluation stage.  For smaller vendors, 
the findings imply that they must continue to differentiate themselves in the marketplace 
based on their ability to offer efficient and personalized solutions/service to their 
customers.  Smaller vendors can also engage in positioning strategies that capitalize on 




demonstrated by this study.  For instance, while larger vendors are often perceived as less 
responsive to customer support needs of buyers, smaller vendors can position themselves 
as more efficient in responding to complaints and other customer service issues. 
Vendor Firm Size and Perceptions of Technological Uncertainty 
 The lack of support for H2, that proposes a negative linkage between vendor size 
and technological uncertainty, essentially stems from a variety of industry-specific traits 
that include overall pace of technological change in outsourced IT solutions as well as 
increasing understanding of advanced IT solutions on the part of organizational buyers.  
When asked which IT solution/function their organization outsourced in the past twelve 
months, the responses included solutions such as cloud computing, network security, 
network management, and application hosting.  A majority, if not all, of these solutions 
have been available in the marketplace for quite some time now and it is likely that 
organizational buyers, specifically those with internal IT staff, do not perceive 
technological uncertainty surrounding these solutions or their providers.  From a 
managerial perspective, this bodes well specifically for smaller vendors that are often 
perceived to have fewer resources and limited expertise (Larson et al., 2005) hence 
leading to the association of higher technological uncertainty with smaller vendors.    
Vendor Firm Reputation and Perceptions of Opportunism 
 This research shows that strong vendor reputation indeed serves as a key variable 
that reduces buyers’ ex ante perceptions of vendor opportunism in an IT outsourcing 
context.  This is consistent with findings of other scholars that researched buyer-seller 
relationship in non-IT outsourcing contexts such as manufacturing (Hennart 1993; 




reputation instills trust among buyers thereby alleviating the need for costly post-
contractual vendor management processes.  From a managerial viewpoint, the importance 
of vendor reputation cannot be undermined when evaluating and selecting a vendor for an 
outsourced IT solution.  Similarly, for vendors of such solutions, they must continue to 
focus on building a strong reputation for the brand itself as well as the products and 
services associated with it.  Stronger reputation is even more important for off-shore 
outsourced IT solution providers as a buyer may not always have the capability to 
monitor post-contractual activities of these vendors. 
Vendor Firm Reputation and Perceptions of Technological Uncertainty 
 With regard to H4, vendor reputation is negatively related to buyer’s perceptions 
of technological uncertainty, the results carry several implications.  First, the support for 
H4 indicates that stronger overall reputation helps reduce buyers’ perception of 
technological uncertainty, including the risk of obsolescence, associated with the vendor.  
Perception of technological uncertainty is likely to either prevent buyers from engaging 
in a relationship with a vendor altogether or prompt them to seek only short-term 
transactions.  Secondly, by remaining on the cutting-edge of IT, vendors are able to 
garner a reputation for product/service innovation.  The ability to offer innovative 
products and services constitutes an important aspect/trait of firm reputation as identified 
by Caruana (1997) and Chun (2005).  Within the software segment, for instance, 
Microsoft continues to develop upgrades for its operating system as well as other 
productivity applications and these updates and innovations are largely driven by the 
expectations of the customers as well as the innovation-related reputation that the 




Technological Uncertainty and Opportunism 
 The significant support for the linkage between technological uncertainty and 
opportunism is in line with findings in extant literature that identify uncertainty (both 
technological and behavioral) as antecedents to opportunism (Joshi & Stump, 1999; 
McNally & Griffin, 2004; Mysen et al., 2010; Williamson, 1985).  From a managerial 
perspective, buyers must be aware that while they expect IT providers to be on the 
cutting-edge of technology, such technological changes can expose them to the risk of 
costly upgrades, technological obsolescence and incompatibility.  In certain cases, 
technological changes may even increase dependence on the vendor if the IT solutions 
being purchased are based on proprietary systems.  From a vendor’s perspective, given 
the presence of a linkage between technological uncertainty and buyer’s perceptions of 
vendor opportunism, they must keep existing customers apprised of upcoming changes in 
their systems.  Doing so is likely to build trust as opposed to using such product upgrades 
only to squeeze new revenue from clients.  Similarly, ongoing education and training by 
the vendor can also help reduce customer anxiety associated with new technologies hence 
limiting the impact of perceived vendor opportunism on the part of the buyer. 
Limitations 
Similar to other research studies, this paper also has a number of limitations.  
First, this study utilizes a cross-section of IT buyers across a myriad of industries and it is 
quite likely that IT buyers across different industries may vary in their perceptions of 
vendor opportunism and uncertainty compared to the findings of this study.  For instance, 
companies in high-tech industries such as telecom may not perceive a strong fear of 




systems.  Compared to the telecom sector, however, healthcare providers such as 
hospitals may have much to lose in the wake of technological uncertainty. 
Secondly, this study does not focus on a specific outsourced IT solution.  It is 
likely that buyers of outsourced data center services or software-as-a service solution 
such as analytics may vary in their perception of vendor opportunism and technological 
uncertainty compared to those that purchase basic IT installation and maintenance 
services.  Third, the study does not differentiate between domestic versus off-shore IT 
outsourcing providers.  It is likely buyers may associate a higher degree of perceived 
opportunism with off-shore IT outsourcing vendors compared to domestic providers due 
to the inability of buyers to monitor activities of overseas vendors. 
Future Research 
Future research areas could include applying the research model in this paper to 
specific industries in order to determine the similarities and differences across markets.  
For instance, it is likely that buyers in high-tech industries may perceive lower degree of 
opportunism and technological uncertainty associated with IT vendors compared to 
similar respondents whose firms operate in construction and mining and may or may not 
be as tech-savvy. 
Similarly, future research can focus on a specific outsourced IT solution to gain a 
better understanding of how vendor firm attributes influence buyers’ perceptions of 
vendor opportunism and technological uncertainty.  It is likely that outsourced IT 
solutions that are deemed complex may generate different buyer responses with regard to 





Future research can also add additional dependent variables to determine how 
vendor firm size and reputation influence buyers’ perceptions of those variables.  Some 
of those variables can include buyers’ willingness-to-engage in a relationship or the need 
for vendor monitoring given higher perceptions of opportunism and technological 
uncertainty.  Also, future research can include variables from other research streams such 
as service quality to determine how buyers’ ex ante perceptions of vendor opportunism 
and uncertainty affect their perceptions of key outcome variables. 
Conclusion 
This study is unique in its ability to integrate vendor evaluation/selection 
literature with extant research on transaction cost analysis to test how the vendor firm 
attributes of size and reputation influence buyers’ perceptions of vendors on two key 
TCA variables of opportunism and technological uncertainty.  The study hypothesized 
five linkages and its findings supported three of these linkages.  A key finding of the 
study is that while vendor firm reputation negatively impacts buyers’ perceptions of 
vendor opportunism, vendor firm size positively correlates with such perceptions.  This is 
an important finding in that it creates a dilemma for vendors that otherwise may have a 
positive reputation yet their larger size may signal higher degree of perceived 
opportunism to buyers of outsourced IT services.   
The findings in this paper also offer an alternative perspective to what had been 
previously found in buyer-seller and transaction cost research (Hill, 1990; Nooteboom, 
1993; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Larson et al., 2005) that labeled smaller suppliers/vendors 
as having lower reputation, greater short-term orientation, and lack of expertise, 




antecedent to buyers’ ex ante perceptions of opportunism.  Also, the results of this study 
do not support the negative linkage between vendor size and buyers’ perceptions of 
technological uncertainty.  This bodes well for smaller vendors in that lack of perceived 
technological uncertainty based on vendor firm size is less likely to prevent smaller IT 
outsourcing providers from effectively competing for business.  At the same time, the 
negative relationship between vendor reputation and technological uncertainty conveys 
the message that while firm size may not foster perceptions of technological uncertainty, 
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CHAPTER 3 (ESSAY 2)  
Influence of Opportunism and Uncertainty on Buyers’ Relationship Governance Choices  
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the influence of organizational buyers’ opportunism and 
uncertainty perceptions on their willingness-to-engage in contractual and relational 
governance with a vendor.  The increased use of outsourced services has precipitated 
considerable change in buyer-seller relations in that organizations are seeking optimal 
outsourcing arrangements that not only reduce operating costs but also reduce the risk of 
vendor opportunism.  While it is not possible to eradicate all opportunism and 
uncertainty, it is important to understand how the presence of these variables affects the 
relationship engagement choices of the outsourcing firm or the buyer.   
From a buyer’s perspective, understanding which relationship governance choice 
to employ when facing opportunism and uncertainty can help reduce their overall 
exposure to such risks.  At the same time, effective understanding of buyers’ relationship 
governance choices for outsourcing arrangements provides suppliers with greater insight 
into buyer behavior.  Such insight is important for the supplier to align or realign its 
service-engagement and other strategies in order to reduce the incidence of lost business.  
In addition, this paper examines how organizational buyers’ perceptions of vendor 
opportunism and uncertainty mediate the relationship between vendor firm size and 






While the role of opportunism and uncertainty has been researched extensively 
within the context of outsourcing, there is a paucity of research linking vendor size and 
reputation to buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty, as well as their 
relationship choices.  The research model is tested on an online panel of information 
technology (IT) buyers across a range of industries.  Findings suggest that buyers’ 
perceptions of opportunism and technological uncertainty do not have a direct impact on 
their relationship choices.  The study also finds direct linkages between both vendor size 
and vendor reputation in relation to buyers’ willingness-to-engage in legal 




Keywords: transaction cost analysis, opportunism, technological uncertainty, vendor 






Introduction     
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of perceived opportunism 
and uncertainty on organizational buyers’ choice of relationship governance with an 
outsourcing service provider.  The past two decades have seen enormous growth in the 
level of outsourcing within the business-to-business (B2B) marketplace (Duan, Grover, & 
Balakrishnan, 2009; Gholami, 2012; Lacity, Solomon, Yan, & Willcocks, 2011).  
Organizations of all sizes and scope are increasingly relying on outsourced solutions to 
reduce operating and capital expenses (Ang & Straub, 1998; Gilley & Rasheed, 2000).  
Outsourcing involves contracting out a range of business tasks and functions that were 
historically performed in-house.  Given that most, if not all, outsourced arrangements 
face the risk of vendor opportunism and uncertainty (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; 
Williamson, 1975), it is important for the buying organization to not only understand the 
degree of opportunism and uncertainty embedded in a transaction but also what 
governance choices should be adopted to cope with these variables. 
Opportunism, within the transaction cost analysis (TCA) literature, involves 
behaviors such as deceiving, performance avoidance, and providing false or incorrect 
information (Williamson, 1975) and can come into play in a variety of ways in a buyer-
seller exchange (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  Uncertainty includes lack of ability to predict 
the changes in various aspects of an exchange or transaction that then forces post-
contractual adjustments (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Walker & Weber 1984).  The 
importance of effective vendor management is vital in that passive vendor management 
can introduce the outsourcing organization to a range of operational issues including 




Wathne & Heide, 2000).  Within the context of outsourcing, organizations typically face 
two choices with regard to vendor management.  The first choice rests upon post-
contractual or ex post monitoring of vendor activities which requires the buying 
organization to invest resources in monitoring systems (Williamson, 1994).  These 
monitoring tools, while costly, are also unlikely to provide a buyer with insight into the 
full scope and extent of vendor opportunism and uncertainty.  The second choice focuses 
on effective vendor evaluation and selection mechanisms that are likely to limit the 
incidence of post-contractual opportunism and uncertainty.   
Existing scholarly research within outsourcing (Gholami, 2012; Mysen, Svensson, 
& Payan, 2010; Wang, 2002) and transaction cost analysis (Brown, Dev, & Dong-Jin, 
2000; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Lonsdale, 2001) has evaluated and suggested various 
mechanisms to reduce post-contractual opportunism and uncertainty.  However, there is a 
gap in existing research with regard to the linkages between a priori perceptions of 
opportunism and uncertainty and buyers’ choice of a specific relationship governance 
mode.  For instance, while Wathne and Heide (2000) proposed options such as 
monitoring to curb post-contractual vendor opportunism, their research does not discuss 
whether and how perceptions of opportunism, actually affect a buyer’s willingness-to-
engage in a legal contract or a relational exchange.   
This paper studies the influence of buyers’ opportunism and uncertainty 
perceptions and how they affect their willingness-to-engage in contractual or relational 
governance with the outsourcing vendor.  In addition, the study examines if and to what 
extent opportunism and uncertainty mediate the relationship between vendor firm 




relational governance mechanism.  By examining linkages between opportunism and 
uncertainty, this paper fills a number of gaps in existing transaction cost, outsourcing, and 
buyer-seller relationship literature.  Extant literature in these areas (Celly, Spekman, 
Robert, & Kamauff, 1999; Cannon & Homburg, 2001; Paulraj & Chen, 2007; Richmond, 
Seidmann, & Whinston, 1992; Weed & Mitchell, 1980) has failed to address how a priori 
perceptions of vendor opportunism and uncertainty influence buyers’ relationship choice.  
Secondly, by studying how opportunism and uncertainty perceptions mediate the 
relationship between vendor firm characteristics and buyers’ relationship choices, this 
research contributes to the existing vendor selection literature.  Identification and 
understanding of such linkages can provide buyers with a complementing vendor 
evaluation model while helping vendors develop insights into buyer behavior.  The study 
utilizes a survey of IT procurement professionals to test the linkages between 
organizational buyers’ perceptions of opportunism, technological uncertainty and their 
relationship preferences with outsourced IT providers.  The findings are discussed along 
with limitations of the study and future research opportunities.      
Background Literature  
The growth in domestic and international B2B outsourcing arrangements has 
changed the cultural and economic fabric of an organization in that while it has led to a 
reduction in operating costs, it has placed a greater onus on buyer-seller relationship 
management.  Within existing scholarly research, outsourcing has been examined by both 
transaction cost as well as relational exchange scholars (Hawkins, Knipper, & Strutton, 
2009; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Lonsdale, 2001; Mysen et al., 2010; Rokkan, Heide, & 




hierarchical or in-house product and service development over outsourcing (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).  Specifically, from a seller’s perspective, higher 
perceptions of opportunism can prompt buyers to engage in arm’s length or discrete 
transactions with suppliers, thereby limiting the prospects of ongoing revenues for the 
vendor.  Such discrete transactions may increase overall customer acquisition costs for 
vendors in that at the end of a transaction cycle, a vendor would have to either identify 
and attract new customers or engage in costly renegotiations with the existing buyer.  
From the buyers’ viewpoint, repeated discrete transactions likely increase the time and 
costs involved in the vendor evaluation and selection process.  
Given the pervasiveness of B2B outsourced services, the transaction cost debate 
has shifted more toward identifying and implementing effective buyer-seller relationship 
strategies (Carson, Madhook, & Wu, 2006; Joshi & Stump, 1996) as opposed to finding 
the appropriate mix between hierarchical vs. market arrangements.  Within the buyer-
seller relational exchange research stream, scholars such as Stump and Heide (1996) offer 
a range of control mechanisms such as relationship-specific investments and monitoring 
as tools for addressing post-contractual or ex post supplier opportunism.  However, their 
research does not address whether a priori opportunism perceptions on the part of the 
buyer will increase or decrease the likelihood of the buyer engaging in contractual or 
relational governance with the supplier.  
Similarly, Wang, Li, Ross, & Craighead (2012) suggest ways firms can use social 
capital to guard against the risk of opportunism.  While their research addresses how 
greater social capital affects the degree of opportunism, it does not establish a linkage 




Still others such as Fink, Edelman, & Hatten (2006) studied the relationship between 
supplier technological uncertainty and its impact on customer performance, but their 
research did not assess the direct impact of such uncertainty on buyer’s relationship 
choices.   
An effective understanding of linkages between perceived opportunism and 
uncertainty and buyers’ choice of a relationship governance mode can assist suppliers in 
crafting and revamping their service marketing strategies.  Such an understanding can 
also help buyers identify and seek relationship choices that best help cope with 
opportunism and uncertainty inherent in a particular transaction.  While current vendor 
selection research such as that undertaken by Sarkis and Talluri (2002), Harmon, Conrad, 
& Brown (1997), and Tracey and Tan (2001) provides a range of vendor evaluation 
criteria and metrics, their research does not incorporate opportunism and uncertainty.  
Nor does it study how ex ante vendor opportunism and uncertainty perceptions affect 
buyers’ relationship preferences.  Similarly, while Hoetker (2005), DeBoer, Labro, & 
Morlacchi (2001), and Wu (2008), have studied supplier selection from varying 
perspectives, their research does not establish linkages between supplier firm 
characteristics, opportunism, uncertainty, and relationship preferences of the buyer.   
The sections below encompass a brief overview of scholarly research on vendor 
firm characteristics, transaction cost variables of opportunism and uncertainty, and buyer-
seller relational exchange.  A summary table of constructs and construct definitions used 
in Essay 1 is provided in Table 3.8.  The paper then examines the relationship between 
buyers’ perceptions of opportunism and uncertainty and their preferences for a particular 




interaction between vendor firm characteristics, buyers’ a priori perceptions of 
opportunism and uncertainty, and their willingness-to-engage in contractual and/or 
relational governance with a particular outsourcing service provider. 
Figure 3.1: Research Model 
 
 
Dashed lines indicate mediating relationship. 
Buyer-Seller Relationship Governance 
Legal contracts/bonds. 
 Most buyer-seller relationships involve some sort of a contractual arrangement 
that formally specifies the future roles, duties, responsibilities, and penalties for non-
conformance (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Macneil, 1978).  In the past two decades, much 
emphasis has been placed on developing mutually beneficial relational exchanges 




2009).  Despite the increased focus on relational exchanges, contractual bonds remain the 
primary focus of many buyer-seller arrangements including outsourced services (Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002; Richmond et al., 1992).  Contractual relations, also labeled as legal 
bonds by Cannon and Perreault (1999), typically provide the buyer with the opportunity 
to reduce perceived risks in an outsourcing arrangement by listing specific performance 
requirements as well as remedies for breach of various clauses.   
 The importance of formal contracts has also been emphasized by agency theory 
scholars such as Eisenhardt (1989) in that a tightly structured contract is likely to 
suppress self-serving behavioral tendencies or opportunism on the part of the agent (or 
seller).  In addition, such contracts also reduce the need for costly monitoring.  In order to 
avoid performance deviances on the part of the agent (or seller or channel partner), Celly 
and Frazier (1996) suggest implementation of outcome-based or performance-contingent 
contracts that compensate the seller/supplier only when certain pre-defined metrics are 
satisfactorily accomplished.  Conversely, Jaworski and McInnis (1989) argue that under 
conditions of environmental uncertainty, use of outcome-based contracts can be 
detrimental to the buyer-seller relationship in that such contracts may erroneously hold 
the supplier responsible for factors that are beyond their control.   
 Despite the extensive usage of contractual arrangements in buyer-seller 
exchanges, Williamson (1975) argues that all contracts are incomplete due to the 
presence of bounded rationality whereby there exist constraints on the decision-makers’ 
ability to anticipate all relevant contingencies surrounding an exchange.  Given the 
bounded rationality assumption as well as the potential of opportunism and uncertainty in 




affect the buyers’ decision to engage in a contractual relationship with a particular 
outsourced solution provider.  Such an understanding can help vendors develop and 
incorporate elements into their outsourcing contracts that are perceived as mutually 
beneficial by the buyer.   
Relational exchange/governance. 
 While the contractual relationships are said to be more specific (Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999), such exchanges are viewed as arm’s length transactions by scholars 
such as Barringer (1997) and Dwyer et al. (1987).  The strong focus of legal contracts on 
performance of specific tasks within set time frames is likely to contribute to arm’s length 
perception of such relationships.  Barringer (1997) argues that while contractual 
relationships are not exactly the same as discrete transactions, they still employ a similar 
governance mechanism as a discrete, arm’s length transaction.   
Compared to contractual relationships that may often span shorter time periods, 
relational exchanges involve an extended time horizon and are designed to mutually 
benefit both parties (Heide, 1994; Macneil 1980).  Extant literature on buyer-seller 
relationship identifies a relational exchange as having the following attributes: long-term 
orientation, mutual dependence, mutual trust, and open communications (Dwyer et al., 
1987; Ganesan 1994).  Heide (1994) further classifies relational exchange as an 
arrangement in which the parties involved share common norms.   
In addition to the above listed attributes of relational exchanges, these 
relationships are also often likely to involve bilateral investments on the part of the buyer 
and the seller or channel partner (Rokkan et al., 1994).  Such investments usually exhibit 




unilateral asset investment in the transaction cost literature is viewed as a condition that 
leads to safeguarding problems (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).   Bilateral investments, to 
the contrary, are reflective of mutual trust more so than serving as an opportunism 
deterrent. 
While a range of scholars have covered relational exchange or relational 
contracting (Brown et al., 2000; Fink et al., 2006; Heide, 1994, Weitz & Jap, 1995), most 
have focused on relational governance within the context of channel relationship 
management.  There exists a gap in relational exchange research with regard to how 
buyers’ a priori perceptions of opportunism and uncertainty affect their vendor 
relationship choices.  An awareness and understanding of the relationship between 
opportunism and uncertainty and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in a relational exchange 
can help vendors rethink and adjust their positioning strategies. 
Hypotheses Development 
This section examines the relationship connectors between independent and 
dependent variables as well as proposes hypotheses.  Similar to the overview of construct 
and construct definitions, hypotheses examined in Essay 1 are summarized in Table 3.9.  
In addition to the main model, the section also discusses mediation hypotheses.   
Opportunism, Technological Uncertainty, and Buyer’s Relationship Preferences 
Opportunism, technological uncertainty, and contractual relationship. 
 Since opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 
1975), both transaction cost and agency scholars (Carson et al., 2006; McNally & Griffin, 
2004; Stump & Heide, 1996) suggest various contractual arrangements to limit the 




does not offer any guidance on whether higher a priori opportunism perceptions on the 
part of the buyers actually force them to seek stringent legal contracts/bonds with their 
exchange partners.  A key factor that renders it difficult to assess opportunism is the 
degree of information asymmetry that may exist between the vendor and the buyer 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000).  In order to cope with the information asymmetry problem, a 
buyer typically has two options: increase the degree of monitoring which may require the 
buyer to incur additional costs, or to seek outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Monitoring of vendor behavior can be cost prohibitive (Stump & Heide, 1996) as a buyer 
may have to invest significant resources in developing and deploying a monitoring 
mechanism.  Monitoring is also less likely to be an option for relationships with shorter 
duration.   
 The use of contractual arrangements to guard against opportunism is prevalent in 
the TCA, outsourcing, and channel relationship literature (Celly & Frazier, 1996; Platz & 
Temponi, 2007; Wathne & Heide, 2000).  For instance, Richmond et al. (1992) contend 
that in a comprehensive contract, the roles and expectations of each party are explicitly 
stated thereby reducing the potential of opportunism-related payoffs.  Similarly, Platz and 
Temponi (2007) suggest that a well-structured contract can reduce the incidence of 
conflict of interest between the buyer and the seller thereby leading to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between buyers’ perceptions of opportunism 
and their willingness-to-engage in a contractual relationship with the outsourced 
vendor. 




including Williamson (1975) and Barringer (1997) agree that uncertainty renders most 
buyer-seller contracts as incomplete.  This forces parties in an exchange to either seek 
amendments in existing contracts (Geyskens et al., 2006) or disband their relationship 
altogether.  Richmond et al. (1992) argue that most information system outsourcing 
contracts are incomplete due to changing technological and organizational (both buyer 
and vendor) environments.  Moreover, merger and acquisition activities on the part of the 
outsourcing organization and or its suppliers are further likely to render existing contracts 
as incomplete or unenforceable. 
McNally and Griffin (2004) suggest that when facing environmental and 
behavioral uncertainty, a buying firm is likely to opt for a joint action with the supplier as 
opposed to seeking arm’s length relationships.  Similarly, if the parties to an exchange 
perceive lower levels of uncertainty, they are less likely to engage in a relational 
exchange and more likely to seek contractual arrangements (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978; 
Williamson, 1985).  Fink et al. (2006) further contend that when anticipating 
environmental and/or technological uncertainty in a transaction, buyers and suppliers 
tend to seek a relational exchange in order to reduce the overall risk.  The following 
hypothesis is therefore proposed:     
H2: There is a negative relationship between buyers’ perceptions of technological 
uncertainty and their willingness-to-engage in a contractual relationship with the 
outsourced vendor.   
Opportunism, uncertainty, and relational governance/exchange.  
 When perceiving a higher degree of opportunism, parties to an exchange are less 




open communications and confidential information sharing.  Information sharing is 
identified as a key trait of inter-organizational relational exchanges (Cannon & Perreault, 
1997; Cannon & Homburg, 2001).  Greater information sharing is generally employed 
with the objective to reduce information asymmetry that exists between the buyer and the 
seller and provides a buyer with insights into a supplier’s future plans (Cannon & 
Homburg, 2001).  While confidential information-sharing or open communication with 
the buyer also enables a supplier to better anticipate the environmental uncertainties in 
the buyer’s business, such level of collaboration is unlikely in the presence of 
opportunism (John, 1984).  When perceiving opportunism, parties to a transaction are 
unlikely to engage in confidential information-sharing given that it may create a 
safeguarding problem (Heide & John, 1990).     
 Moreover, a higher degree of opportunism also affects the willingness-to-engage 
in an extended relationship with each other (Ono & Kubo, 2009).  Long-term or extended 
relationships closely resemble the attributes of a relational exchange and often involve 
relationship-specific investments by the exchange partners (Rokkan et al., 2003).  When 
facing a higher degree of opportunism, however, the parties to an exchange are less likely 
to make relationship-specific investments as such assets often create a lock-in condition 
(Godfrey & Hill, 1995; Lonsdale, 2001) thereby leading to the following hypothesis: 
 H3: There is a negative relationship between buyers’ perceptions of opportunism 
and their willingness-to-engage in a relational exchange with the outsourced 
vendor.   
Uncertainty is a condition that renders all contracts as incomplete (Richmond et 




Zenger, 2002; Williamson, 1975).  Specifically with regard to technology that faces rapid 
changes in specifications and a higher risk of obsolescence, it is less likely that a buyer 
and a supplier will anticipate and include all relevant contingencies in a formal contract 
(Richmond et al., 1992).  Stated otherwise, the notion of comprehensive contracts is 
rather rare in IT outsourcing arrangements due to the inherent uncertainty in technology.  
Furthermore, such inherent uncertainty is also likely to have a negative impact on the 
overall success of an IT outsourcing initiative (Wang, 2002).  The incomplete contracting 
phenomenon in IT outsourcing therefore renders it important for buyers and suppliers to 
collaborate closely to accomplish the overall transaction objectives.    
In their study of the relationship between IT managers and their outsourced 
vendors, Poppo and Zenger (2002) found that technological uncertainty combined with 
asset specificity led IT managers to seek closer relationships with their suppliers.  
Similarly, Noordewier, John, & Nevin (1990) also found the presence of a relationship 
between environmental uncertainty and relational exchange in their research on 
performance outcomes in buyer-seller exchanges.  Still others (Crocker & Masten, 1991; 
Macneil, 1978; Williamson, 1991) found that inter-firm arrangements are more likely to 
follow a relational exchange when facing higher degrees of environmental and 
technological uncertainty.  This is likely a function of the higher costs of adaptations that 
may need to be made to traditional contracts as a result of the changes in the environment 
surrounding inter-firm relationships thereby leading to the following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between buyers’ perceptions of technological 
uncertainty and their willingness-to-engage in a relational exchange with the 




Mediating Role of Opportunism and Uncertainty 
 Opportunism is identified as a variable that affects many outcomes and decisions 
in a buyer-supplier exchange (Wang, 2002; Wathne & Heide, 2000).  In addition, the 
degree of opportunism also impacts the relationship governance choices in a buyer-
supplier or manufacturer-channel exchange (Brown et al., 2000; Heide and John, 1990).  
Williamson (1975) contends that market arrangements are preferred for transactions that 
face a lower risk of opportunism.  Regarding the linkages between firm reputation, 
opportunism, and governance choices, TCA and relational exchange scholars agree on 
the notion that firm reputation serves as a deterrent against opportunism and opportunistic 
behavior (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Wang, 2002).  Firm reputation is not 
only associated with trust (Kwon, 2004), but it is also cited as a key driver or indicator of 
firm performance.  Bharadwaj (2000) states that signaling a sense of assurance to a 
potential buyer will improve the likelihood that a buyer will prefer relational as opposed 
to arm’s length contractual exchange.  Similarly, a weaker reputation is likely to increase 
the perceived degree of opportunism on the part of the buyer (Houston & Johnson, 2000) 
thereby forcing the buyer to seek legal bonds as a safeguarding mechanism.   
H5: The relationship between vendor firm reputation and buyers’ relationship 
governance choices is mediated by buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism. 
With regard to uncertainty, relational scholars (Crocker & Masten, 1991; Macneil, 
1978) suggest that when facing uncertainty, buying firms tend to choose collaboration or 
relational exchange over structured contractual arrangements.  Rindova, Williamson, 
Petkova, & Sever (2005 p. 1035) state that a firm’s reputation generally comprises two 




evaluate a specific attribute of a firm such as its products or services) as well as 
prominence (the extent to which a firm is a recipient of mass recognition in its industry).  
Both these dimensions of reputation are likely to reduce the uncertainty perception of the 
buyer as well as their relationship governance choices.         
H6: The relationship between vendor firm reputation and buyers’ relationship 
governance choices is mediated by buyers’ perceptions of vendor technological 
uncertainty. 
The linkages between vendor firm size, opportunism, and relationship governance 
choices are evident from research conducted by various scholars including Larson et al. 
(2005), and Nooteboom (1992).  Larson et al. (2005) found that larger buying 
organizations are likely to engage in closer and collaborative relationships with larger 
suppliers as smaller suppliers are less likely to invest in various collaboration 
technologies such as electronic data interchange (EDI).  Larger suppliers not only have 
greater resources at their disposal (Nooteboom, 1992), they are also likely to enjoy a 
stronger reputation (Doney & Cannon, 1997).   
Similarly, the study conducted by Redondo and Fierro (2007) found that firm size 
has an impact on the long-term orientation of buyer-supplier relationships.  Smaller firms 
are also said to incur higher costs for themselves as well as their partners due to the lack 
of economies of scale (Nooteboom, 1992).  Moreover, from an opportunism and 
uncertainty perspective, smaller firms, lacking in strong reputation are likely to be 
perceived as opportunistic due to their focus on short-term gains (Homer, 1985).  At the 
same time, there is likely greater technological uncertainty surrounding their products and 




as lacking expertise (Carmel & Nicholson, 2005).  
H7: The relationship between vendor firm size and buyers’ relationship 
governance choices is mediated by buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism. 
H8: The relationship between vendor firm size and buyers’ relationship 
governance choices is mediated by buyers’ perceptions of vendor technological 
uncertainty.  
Control Variables 
Based on extant literature on transaction cost and relational exchange (Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999; Geyskens et al., 2006; Larson et al., 1997; Nooteboom, 1992), the 
control variables analyzed in this study include size of the buying organization, 
idiosyncratic or relationship-specific investments, and information sharing/exchange 
between the buyer and the supplier or vendor.  A summary table of control variables and 
their definitions used in Essay 1 is provided in Table 3.10.   
Methodology 
Sample 
This research utilizes a sample that includes an online panel of IT buyers across a 
variety of industries.  As discussed by Skinner, Autry, & Lamb (2009), panel-based 
samples do not lead to significantly different results compared to the studies that utilize 
other sample selection mechanisms.  The use of IT procurement professionals also aligns 
with other research that studied outsourcing as well as other B2B phenomenon such as 
transaction cost analysis (Huber & Power, 1985; Wang, 2002; Whitten & Leidner, 2006).   
First, the study employed screening questions in order to ensure that sample 




questions focused on the respondents’ level of involvement and role in their organizations 
IT procurement process, number of years in IT purchasing, and whether their 
organizations outsourced an IT function/solution in the past 12 months.  Non-filtered 
respondents were then asked to list the solution they outsourced along with the vendors 
they evaluated and selected for such solutions.  Lastly, the respondents were asked to 
select a vendor that they closely evaluated but did not select for the identified IT solution.   
Data Collection Procedures 
Altogether, 1,478 IT procurement professionals were invited to participate in the 
survey.  At the onset of the survey, an initial 66 respondents took the survey and the 
survey link was disabled temporarily to review for validity and accuracy of preliminary 
responses.  The survey was then re-launched and an additional 154 respondents 
completed the survey, bringing the total to 220.  In order to increase the sample size, a 
third stage of the survey was launched a week later that included reminders to 
respondents that had not taken the survey.  This effort yielded 81 more surveys bringing 
the total number of completed surveys to 301.  Using the recommendations of Armstrong 
and Overton (1977), the results for each stage were then compared to ensure consistency.   
The results of the consistency check did not reveal any major differences between the 
means, standard deviations, and reliability scores for each of the three stages of the 
survey. 
Respondent Profile 
The 301 completed surveys provided a response rate of 20.4 percent.  The 
collected survey data was then analyzed to identify missing data or inaccurate/invalid 




of 98 respondents that had either entered invalid/inaccurate responses or had missing 
data.  The elimination of 98 respondents was based on their inability to satisfy additional 
criteria such as size of the respondents’ organization, depth of their experience with IT 
procurement, etc.  The 203 valid surveys provided a usable response rate of 13.7 percent.   
The sample respondent profile is detailed in Table 1.  A total of 72.4 percent of 
the 203 respondents stated that they had the final say over their organization’s IT 
outsourcing while the remainder, 27.6 percent, classified their role as that of a 
recommender or influencer.  The respondents reflected a cross-section of industries 
including manufacturing (24.6 percent), construction (7.9 percent), professional services 
(7.9 percent), retailing (6.9 percent), telecommunications (4.4 percent), and education 
(4.4 percent).  The rest of the respondents (43.9 percent) were affiliated with a multitude 
of industries, with each having less than four percent of the total sample share.  
Table 3.1: Respondent Profile 
Male 66% 
Female 34% 
Number of Years Employed with their Current Organization (median) 7 
Number of Years in IT Procurement (median) 10 
Respondents’ Annual IT Procurement Responsibility (median)   $400,000 
Number of Employees in the Firm (median) 530 
Annual Revenues of the Firm (median) $34 million 
Annual IT Budget of the Firm (median) $750,000 
Percent of Total IT Budget Dedicated to Outsourcing (median) 25% 
 
 
Adopted from Essay-1  
 
Measures 
Scales were used from extant literature and adapted where needed. All scales met 
the reliability guidelines by Nunnally (1978).  Appendix-II contains the adapted scales. 
The Vendor Reputation Scale included eleven items (anchors: strongly disagree/strongly 




fairness/honesty, product/service quality, and vision/leadership.  Of the eleven items, four 
items were adapted from Ganesan (1994) that measured vendor reputation for fairness 
and honesty.  Seven additional items were adapted from the Reputation Quotient (RQ) 
developed by Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever (2000), Chun (2005), and Caruana (1997) 
including four items for product/service quality reputation and three items for reputation 
for vision and leadership.  Vendor size measures were adapted from Doney and Cannon 
(1997) and contained a four-item 7-point Likert-type scale.   
With regard to buyers’ opportunism perceptions, the scale used by Rokkan et al. 
(2003) was adapted to fit the ex ante or vendor evaluation context.  The 7-point Likert-
type scale contained six items.  Technological uncertainty items were adapted from the 
four-item 7-point scale used by Stump and Heide (1996).  With regard to willingness-to 
engage in contractual relationship/legal bonds, five items measured on a 7-point Likert-
scale format, were adapted from Carey et al. (2011).  The buyers’ willingness-to-engage 
in a relational exchange construct adapted three items from Joshi and Stump (1999) and 
an additional three items from Poppo and Zenger (2002).  All items were based on 7-
point Likert-type scales.  
In addition, the research model also included three control variables that focused 
on buyers’ firm size, willingness of the vendor to make relationship-specific or 
idiosyncratic investments, as well as open sharing of information by the vendor.  With the 
exception of buyer size which was measured by the number of employees as suggested 
by Larson et al. (2005), the other two variables were adapted from established scales for 
idiosyncratic investments (Anderson & Weitz, 1992) and information sharing (Doney & 




Research Technique/Data Analysis 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is employed to determine the nature and 
extent of the relationship between IT buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism and 
technological uncertainty and their relationship choices with the vendors.  Specifically, 
SPSS and AMOS were used to run the data analysis.  To test mediation, the paper 
followed the mediation testing guidelines provided by Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1176): 
a) changes in independent variables (vendor firm characteristics) significantly 
influence changes in the mediating variables (opportunism and technological 
uncertainty) 
b) changes in mediators have a significant impact on the dependent variables 
(legal contracts/bonds and relational governance), and 
c) the relationship between independent and dependent variables is no longer 
significant when controlling for the mediating variables.      
As suggested by Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson (2010), if the relationship 
between independent (vendor firm characteristics) and dependent variables (relationship 
choices) remains significant and unchanged after including the mediating variables 
(opportunism and uncertainty), then mediation will not be supported.  However, if the 
direct relationship between independent and dependent variables remains significant but 
is reduced when mediating variables are included, then a partial mediation will be 
supported (Hair et al., 2010).  Lastly, if the direct relationship between independent and 
dependent variables is not statistically significant (p < .01) when the mediating variables 






Measurement Model Results 
The initial measurement model tested 46 items.  The results revealed the 
following: Chi-Square = 1940.226; DF = 999; CMIN/DF = 1.942; CFI = 0.89; TLI = 
0.881; RMSEA = 0.068, all within the guidelines suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999) 
and Hair et al. (2010).  While these results suggested acceptable fit, modification indices 
were reviewed.  In doing so, construct items that reflected higher unstandardized 
regression weights, a value higher than 10, as well as those that had higher standardized 
residual covariances, higher than |4|, were identified as candidates for deletion.  This 
process was carried out in iterations in that the model was run subsequently after deletion 
of individual items in order to assess the enhancement in model fit.  The final 
measurement model comprised of 33 items with results indicating an adequate fit (Chi-
Square = 821.693; DF = 492; CMIN/DF = 1.67; CFI = 0.943; TLI = 0.935; RMSEA = 
0.058).  Reliabilities, means, and standard deviations for each construct are presented in 












Table 3.2: Scale Reliability Results  
Construct Reliability (α) Mean Std. Deviation 
Vendor Size  
(4 items) 0.895 5.087 1.342 
Vendor Reputation 
(7 items) 0.934 5.415 0.995 
Perceived Opportunism  
(6 items) 0.971 3.616 1.973 
Perceived Technological 
Uncertainty (4 items) 0.910 3.857 1.385 
Willingness-to-Engage in Legal 
Contracts/Bonds (3 items) 0.865 5.567 1.130 
Willingness-to-Engage in 
Relational Governance (3 items) 0.768 5. 300 1.119 
Idiosyncratic Investments by 
Vendor – control (3 items) 0.895 4.828 1.356 
Information Sharing by Vendor – 
control  (3 items) 0.915 4.278 1.724 
Partially Adopted from Essay-1  
Note: Buyer size, the third control variable, is excluded from the table given that it was measured using a 
single item variable (number of employees). 
 
All constructs met the convergent validity requirements including AVE scores 
higher than 0.50, Eigenvalues greater than 1, and reliability scores above 0.70 as 
identified by Hair et al. (2010).  Table 3.3 portrays the results for convergent validity. 
Each construct was then tested for discriminant validity following the guideline provided 
by Fornell and Larcker (1981) that involved a comparison of AVE with squared inter-
construct correlations for all constructs.  Results of discriminant validity are highlighted 

















Vendor Size (4items) 0.687 2.747 
Vendor Reputation (7 items) 0.673 4.713 
Perceived Opportunism (6 items) 0.849 5.094 
Perceived Technological 
Uncertainty (4 items) 0.720 2.878 
Willingness-to-Engage in Legal 
Contracts/Bonds (3 items) 0.685 2.054 
Willingness-to-Engage in 
Relational Governance (3 items) 0.545 1.635 
Idiosyncratic Investments by 
Vendor – control (3 items) 0.747 2.240 
Information Sharing by Vendor – 
control  (3 items) 0.789 2.366 
Note: Buyer size, the third control variable, is excluded from the table given that it was measured using a 
































Table 3.4: Discriminant Validity Results  





        
SZ 1        
REP 0.231 1       
OPP 0.075 0.011 1      
TU 0.004 0.005 0.247 1     
LB 0.058 0.295 0.006 0.012 1    
RE 0.162 0.347 0.002 0.004 0.445 1   
IDV 0.106 0.318 0.050 0.012 0.244 0.270 1  
ISV 0.055 0.104 0.206 0.078 0.029 0.111 0.542 1 
SZ = Vendor size; REP = Vendor reputation; OPP = Perceived opportunism; TU = Perceived 
technological uncertainty; IDV = Idiosyncratic investments by vendor; ISV = Information sharing by 
vendor 
 
Note: Buyer size, the third control variable, is excluded from the table given that it was measured using a 
single item variable (number of employees). 
 
Common Method Variance (CMV) 
Common method variance issues were assessed.  According to Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff (2003), CMV reflects the amount of variance that stems 
from the use of a specific measurement method as opposed to the constructs that are 
represented by the various items or measures.  In assessing for CMV, this paper used the 
procedures suggested by Podsakoff and Organ (1986) and included use of different 
anchors for many of the questions as well as conducting a one-factor test.  The results of 




accounted for majority of the variance.  Moreover, three marker variables were also used 
within the data analysis (Williams, Hartman, & Cavazotte, 2010).   
Structural Model Results 
Step one. 
Next, steps were taken to examine the hypothesized linkages. In accordance with 
the Baron and Kenny (1986) guidelines, in Step 1 a model (Model A) with direct paths 
between independent variables (vendor firm characteristics) and mediating variables 
(opportunism and technological uncertainty) was created.  The model also contained 
direct paths between mediating variables and dependent variables (willingness-to-engage 
in legal contracts/bonds and willingness-to-engage in relational governance).  Overall fit 
indicators suggest adequate model fit (Chi-Square = 1010.123; DF = 504; CMIN/DF = 
2.004; CFI = 0.912; TLI = 0.902; RMSEA = 0.071).  Control variables were examined 
for significant linkages. Specifically, idiosyncratic investment by vendor was found to 
have a significant impact on buyers’ willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds (p. 
<.01) and relational governance (p. <.01).  Similarly, information sharing by the vendor 
significantly impacted buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism (p. <.01), 
technological uncertainty (p. <.05), and their willingness-to-engage in legal 
contracts/bonds (p. <.05).   
Next, hypothesized linkages are examined.  Results for H1 do not provide support 
for the linkages (beta of -0.038 and a p. >.05).  Results for H2 are not significant (beta of 
-0.058 and a p. >.05).  The findings fail to support H2.  H3 produced a marginally 
significant relationship (p. <.1) with a beta of -0.063.  Results indicate marginal support 




technological uncertainty and their willingness-to-engage in a relational exchange with 
the vendor exists, however, results do not provide support for this linkages (p. >.05). 
Table 3.5 provides a summary of the hypotheses testing results for the direct effects. 




































































Step 2 involved development of a second model (Model B).  This model 




mediating variables (perceived opportunism and perceived technological uncertainty) as 
well as direct paths from independent variables to dependent variables (willingness-to-
engage in legal contracts/bonds and relational governance).  Further, no paths were tested 
between mediating variables and dependent variables.  This allowed us to examine 
whether a significant direct relationship exists among the independent variables and the 
dependent variables without accounting for the direct influence of the mediating 
variables.   
Overall fit indicators suggest adequate model fit (Chi-Square = 964.890; DF = 
504; CMIN/DF = 1.914; CFI = 0.920; TLI = 0.911; RMSEA = 0.067).  Step 2 yielded an 
improvement in model fit compared to Step 1 due to lower values for Chi-Square, and 
CMIN/DF as well as slightly higher CFI and TLI scores, and a lower RMSEA score.  
Control variables were examined for significant linkages. Idiosyncratic investments by 
the vendor were found to have a significant impact on buyers’ willingness-to-engage in 
legal contracts/bonds (p. <.01) and willingness-to-engage in relational governance (p. 
<.05).  Similarly, information sharing by the vendor significantly impacted buyers’ 
perceptions of vendor opportunism (p. <.01), technological uncertainty (p. <.01), and 













































Vendor Reputation  
Willingness-to-
Engage in Legal 
Contracts/Bonds 
0.428 p<0.01 

















Vendor Size  
Willingness-to-




The results for Model B do not indicate the presence of a significant relationship 
between vendor size and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds.  
However, there exists a marginally significant relationship between vendor size and 
buyers’ willingness-to-engage in relational governance with the vendor.  In examining 
direct paths between independent and dependent variables, the linkage between vendor 
size and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds was insignificant (beta -




engage in relational governance was marginally significant (beta 0.101; p. <.10).  With 
regard to the direct linkage between vendor reputation and buyers’ willingness-to-engage 
in legal contracts/bonds, the relationship was significant (beta 0.428; p. <.01).  Same was 
the case with the linkage between vendor reputation and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in 
relational governance (beta 0.337; p. <.01).   
Step three. 
Step 3 involved testing the full model (Model C) with all the relevant linkages 
between independent (vendor size and vendor reputation) and mediating variables 
(perceived opportunism and perceived technological uncertainty) as well as mediating 
and dependent variables (willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds and relational 
governance).  In addition, the model also tested direct relationships between independent 
variables and dependent variables.  A total of thirteen linkages were examined.  Overall 
fit indicators suggest adequate model fit (Chi-Square = 961.150; DF = 500; CMIN/DF = 
1.922; CFI = 0.920; TLI = 0.910; RMSEA = 0.068).  From an overall fit perspective, 
Model C offers a better goodness-of-fit than Model A due to improved values/scores for 
CMIN/DF, CFI, TLI, and RMSEA.  However, Model B offered better goodness-of-fit 
measures compared to Model C, for CMIN/DF, CFI, TLI, and RMSEA.     
Control variables were reviewed for significant linkages.  In that regard, 
idiosyncratic investments by the vendor had a significant impact on buyers’ willingness-
to-engage in legal contracts/bonds (p. <.01), as well as relational governance (p. <.05).  
Moreover, information sharing by the vendor also significantly impacted buyers’ 
perceptions of vendor opportunism (p. <.01), technological uncertainty (p. <.01), and 

































































Engage in Relational 
Governance 
-0.021 p>0.05 
Vendor Size  Willingness-to-
Engage in Legal 
Contracts/Bonds 
-0.03 p>0.05 
Vendor Size  Willingness-to-
Engage in Relational 
Governance 
0.144 p<0.05 
Vendor Reputation  Willingness-to-
Engage in Legal 
Contracts/Bonds 
0.43 p<0.01 
Vendor Reputation  Willingness-to-




From the perspective of hypotheses, H5 posits that the relationship between 




perceptions of vendor opportunism.  The mediation results highlighted in Tables 6 and 7 
do not offer support for this linkage as the relationship between vendor reputation and 
buyers’ relationship choices (willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds and 
relational governance) remains significant (p. <.01) for both Model B and Model C.  
Similarly, results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 do not lend support to H6 that suggests the 
linkage between vendor reputation and buyers’ relationship choices is mediated by their 
perceptions of technological uncertainty.   
For H7, the relationship between vendor firm size and buyers’ willingness-to-
engage in legal contracts/bonds and relational governance is mediated by buyers’ 
perceptions of vendor opportunism, results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 do not offer support.  No 
changes are detected in the significant/insignificant of the relationship between Model B 
and Model C.  At the same time, H8 that posits that the relationship between vendor firm 
size and buyers’ relationship choices is mediated by their perceptions of technological 
uncertainty, results in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, do not lend support.   
Discussion and Implications 
Perceived Opportunism & Legal Contracts/Bonds 
 Although the study fails to support a positive linkage between buyers’ 
perceptions of vendor opportunism and their willingness-to-engage in legal 
contracts/bonds with the vendor, as outlined in H1, the results, nevertheless, carry several 
meaningful implications for researchers and practitioners.  While previous scholarly 
research on agency theory, transaction cost analysis, and channel management research 
streams (Eisenhardt, 1989; Celly & Frazier, 1996; Wathne & Heide, 2000; Platz & 




buyers need to engage in stringent contractual relationships, including outcome-based 
contracts, to safeguard their interests, this is the first study that actually tested the impact 
of perceived opportunism on buyer’s relationship choices.  The findings of this paper 
essentially offer an alternative perspective to the existing research on agency theory, 
transaction cost, and channel management by showing that higher perceived vendor 
opportunism does not lead to an increased likelihood on the part of buyers to seek 
contractual relationships in the ex ante stage.  Stated otherwise, the results do not support 
the notion that stringent legal contracts/ bonds are perceived as an effective mechanism to 
control post-contractual opportunism.   
A possible explanation resides in research by Nootebom (1992) that alludes to the 
incompleteness of all business contracts due to presences of bounded rationality on the 
part of the buyer.  Bounded rationality refers to the inability of the parties in a transaction 
to anticipate all contingencies in a contractual relationship (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  
In essence, findings of this paper suggest that perhaps buyers lack confidence in the 
ability of formal, legal contracts to provide adequate protection against ex-post vendor 
opportunism thereby reinforcing previous assertions by Williamson (1979) and 
Nooteboom (1992) regarding incompleteness of inter-organizational contracts.   
Perceived Technological Uncertainty & Legal Contracts/Bonds 
 With regard to H2, the negative relationship between perceived technological 
uncertainty and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds with the vendor, 
the results of the study fail to support such a linkage.  Given the focus of this study on 
outsourced IT solutions, it is likely that buyers perhaps anticipate a certain degree of 




applications such as electronic medical records expect that their vendors will perform 
certain application upgrades, over time, in order to keep those applications current and/or 
compatible with other software.   
In essence, within IT outsourcing, technological uncertainty is not only 
anticipated but may even be considered as a norm thereby explaining the lack of support 
for the negative linkage between technological uncertainty and buyers’ willingness-to-
engage in legal contracts/bonds with the vendors.  Overall, existing transaction cost 
research shows that buyers are less likely to seek contractual relationships when 
anticipating a higher degree of technological uncertainty (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; 
Williamson, 1985; Fink et al., 2006).  However, the results of this study reveal a lack of 
support for this perspective, at least within the IT outsourcing context.  
Perceived Opportunism & Relational Governance 
 While the study finds only marginal support for H3, the negative linkage between 
perceived opportunism and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in a relational governance with 
the vendor, these findings align with previous relational exchange and transaction cost 
research.  Previous research (Godfrey & Hill, 1995; Lonsdale, 2001; Ono & Kubo, 2009) 
shows that opportunism in an inter-firm relationship is unlikely to foster information 
sharing and relationship-specific investments by the parties to a transaction.  From a 
managerial perspective, vendors that suffer from higher perceived opportunism are 
unlikely to be viewed as business partners by the buying organization thereby limiting 






Perceived Technological Uncertainty & Relational Exchange 
 With regard to H4, the positive linkage between perceived technological 
uncertainty and the willingness-to-engage in relational governance on the part of the 
buyer, the results do not find support for this hypothesis.  One explanation could be that 
buyer-seller relational exchanges may be more appropriate when procuring customized as 
opposed to standardized solutions.  For instance, within the IT outsourcing context, many 
solutions such as data storage or application hosting are deemed rather standardized 
which essentially renders fear of technological obsolescence as less of an issue for the 
individual buyer.  This in turn alleviates the need on the part of the buyer to seek a closer 
relationship with its vendor(s).   
Also, many IT outsourcing projects involve a certain degree of buyer-seller 
collaboration in general without having technological uncertainty as a precursor to such 
an exchange.  For instance, the implementation cycle for various hospital IT systems can 
span several months and often require close-working relationships among internal 
hospital IT staff as well as vendor’s personnel.  Lastly, the type of solution outsourced 
(simple vs. complex) as well as the length of relationship is also likely to influence the 
degree of relational exchange between the buyers and sellers more so than just the fear of 
technological uncertainty.  In essence, the findings of the study suggest that the mere 
presence of technological uncertainty is unlikely to be a reason for IT buyers to seek 
relational governance with their vendor and other factors must also be taken into 
consideration.     
Mediating Role of Perceived Opportunism and Technological Uncertainty 




perceived opportunism and technological uncertainty between vendor firm characteristics 
(size and reputation) and buyers’ relationship choices (legal contracts/bonds and 
relational governance), this research carries a number of implications.  First, the 
mediation results uncovered a direct, positive relationship between vendor firm size and 
buyers’ willingness-to-engage in relational governance with the vendor.  These results 
reinforce previous findings by Larson et al. (2005) that show larger buyers seek more 
collaborative relationships with larger vendors.   
Second, mediation testing also found a strong, positive relationship between 
vendor reputation and buyers’ willingness-to-engage in legal contracts/bonds as well as 
relational governance.  These results show that within the context of IT outsourcing, 
buyers are more likely to engage in a relationship with a vendor that has a stronger 
reputation.  From an academic perspective, this aligns with previous assertion by Doney 
and Cannon (1997) that vendors with stronger reputation are likely to command higher 
trust on the part of the buyer.  From a managerial viewpoint, lack of a direct positive 
relationship between vendor size and buyer’s willingness-to-engage in a contractual 
agreement reveals that small vendors with stronger reputations are likely to continue to 
win IT outsourcing contracts.  However, for smaller vendors that wish to remain 
competitive in the IT outsourcing vendor evaluation process, they must build a positive 
reputation for innovation, quality/reliability, and personalized service.  
Limitations 
As with most research, the current study has limitations that should be 
highlighted.  These limitations include lack of focus on a specific outsourced IT solution, 




applying this research model within the context of a particular IT solution.  For instance, 
it is likely that buyers may perceive a higher degree of vendor opportunism and 
uncertainty for emerging solutions versus those that have been available in the market for 
some time.   
Similarly, while the respondent base in this survey is comprised of senior IT 
procurement professionals across multiple industries, it is likely that the results of the 
study may vary across individual industries.  Organizations that are new to outsourcing 
may have a different perspective on vendor opportunism and uncertainty compared to 
those that have a history of employing outsourced solutions.  For instance, while firms 
within the financial services and manufacturing sectors have long been engaged in 
outsourcing, others, such as healthcare providers, have only recently begun to employ 
outsourced IT and hence may differ in their perceptions of vendor opportunism and 
uncertainty. 
In addition, given that IT outsourcing is rather global in nature in that it often 
involves global providers and global buyers, this study does not make a distinction 
between domestic vs. off-shore IT outsourcing.  It is likely that buyers may perceive a 
different degree of opportunism and uncertainty attached with off-shore outsourcing 
solutions.  Moreover, the study also does not differentiate between a simple versus a 
complex IT solution.  These differences can have an impact on buyer’s perceptions of 
vendors on accounts of opportunism and technological uncertainty.  
Future Research 
One area of future research revolves around using variables such as idiosyncratic 




model.  These variables may influence the relationship between buyer’s perceptions of 
vendor opportunism and technological uncertainty and their inclination to engage in a 
particular relation type (contractual or relational exchange) with the vendors.  Another 
research avenue could incorporate other TCA and/or relational exchange variables such 
as behavioral uncertainty, performance ambiguity, and goal congruence within the 
existing research model.  Yet another research option could apply the existing research 
model to either specific industry settings or a particular IT solution.  Given that IT 
outsourcing is a global phenomenon, it is important to study buyers’ perceptions of not 
just domestic vendors but also off-shore IT solution providers.  This creates another 
potential area for future research. 
Another potential area for future research would be to evaluate how vendor firm 
attributes impact buyers’ willingness to engage in other aspects of a relational exchange 
such as making relationship-specific investments.  Moreover, future research could also 
evaluate the impact of buyers’ perceptions of vendor opportunism on their willingness to 
employ various vendor monitoring mechanisms.  Yet another avenue of future research 
would be to include buyer’s perceptions of behavioral uncertainty on the part of the 
vendor and how those perceptions then influence their relationship choices with the 
vendor.  Behavioral uncertainty is a key variable in TCA research, however, its impact 
has only been analyzed in an ex post (post contractual) context.   
Conclusion 
This was the first study that directly examined the impact of buyers’ perceptions 
of vendor opportunism and technological uncertainty on their relationship choices in an 




academic community as well as practitioners.  With regard to scholarly research, while 
both TCA as well as agency theory scholars have emphasized the need for “tight” 
contractual agreements to curb ex post or post-contractual opportunism (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Geyskens et al., 2006), this study evaluates how buyer’s ex ante perceptions of 
vendor opportunism and uncertainty affect their relationship choices.  In that regard, this 
study complements existing TCA as well as other research streams including relational 
exchange. 
Another important contribution of this study is that the research findings 
established a direct and positive relationship between vendor firm reputation and buyers’ 
relationship preferences.  From a managerial view point, vendor reputation, and not 
vendor size, influences buyers’ willingness-to-engage in both legal contracts/bonds as 
well as relational governance with vendors of outsourced IT solutions.  For smaller IT 
vendors, this is a positive finding in that if they build a strong reputation, they may be 
equally likely to win outsourcing business in a marketplace that involves larger vendors 






Table 3.8: Summary Overview of the Constructs in Essay 1 
Construct Definition Summary 
Firm Size Firm size is defined by scholars in a 
variety of ways.  Larson et al., (2005) 
defined small suppliers as those with 
fewer than 500 employees.  Similarly, 
Carmel and Nicholson (2005) define a 
small firm based on the number of 
employees.  Krause et al., (1999) define 
small and large suppliers in terms of 
annual sales generated by the supplier.  
Still others such as Doney and Cannon 
(1997) asked buyers’ to classify their 
supplier as a large or small firm.   
Firm size is a rather important indicator of a 
supplier or vendor’s capabilities within the 
vendor evaluation and selection literature as 
well as the buyer-seller relational exchange 
research (Campbell, 1985; Doney & 
Cannon, 1997; Redondo & Fiero, 2007).  
Firm size is also is reflective of the 
bargaining power or the leverage a supplier 
may have in a buyer-seller exchange 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990).   
Reputation Vendor reputation refers to the various 
positive or negative perceptions of an 
organization held by multiple 
stakeholders such as employees, 
customers, investors, and others 
(Fombrun, 1996; Rindova et al., 2005).   
Vendor reputation is a key variable in inter-
firm relational exchanges as it is shown to 
influence important outcomes such as 
opportunism (Wang, 2002) and trust 
(Ganesan, 1994; Kwon, 2004).    From a 
relational exchange perspective, a 
supplier’s desire to protect its reputation 
serves as a deterrent against opportunism 
(Houston and Johnson, 2000).  Within the 
vendor selection literature, reputation is 
also positively linked to product quality and 




Opportunism is defined by Williamson 
(1975) as “self-interest seeking with 
guile and includes a variety of behaviors 
including lying, cheating, misleading, 
shirking, and deceit” Opportunism is a 
key behavioral construct in TCA 
research and one that has been studied in 
inter-firm relationship literature (Jap & 
Anderson, 2003; Ring & Van De Ven, 
1992; Stump & Heide, 1996) as well as 
outsourcing (Parkhe, 1993).   
Opportunism can come into play in the ex 
ante (pre-contract) as well as ex post (post-
contract) stages of a transaction.  For 
instance, in the pre-contract stage, a vendor 
may misrepresent information about its 
capabilities and resources (Williamson, 
1985) while in the ex post stage a vendor 
may change product quality in order to reap 
better margins (Wathne & Heide, 2000).   
Uncertainty Uncertainty pertains to the difficulties in 
foreseeing events and conditions that can 
essentially render a transaction contract 
invalid or incomplete (Williamson, 
1975).  Uncertainty can either be 
environmental and or behavioral 
(Geyskens et al., 2006).  It includes 
changes in demand and supply as well as 
technological requirements.  Behavioral 
uncertainty refers to difficulties 
associated with evaluating performance 
(Geyskens et al., 2006).  Technological 
uncertainty, the variable of interest in 
this research, is a result of the changes in 
technical specifications, product 
complexity, and the risk of technological 
obsolescence (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994).   
Stump and Heide (1996) and Walker and 
Weber (1994) view it as difficulties in 
accurately forecasting the technical 
requirements in an exchange.  Similarly, 
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) contend that 
technological uncertainty is reflected by 
higher frequency of technical change, rising 
intricacies in product architecture, and the 
threat of obsolescence.  In addition to the 
difficulties associated with defining 
technological specifications within an 
outsourced project, Stump and Heidi (1996) 
as well as McNally and Griffin (2004) 
further equate technological uncertainty 
with the risk of technology obsolescence.   




Table 3.9: Summary of Linkages Examined in Essay 1 
Effect/Interaction Linkages 
Vendor size and 
opportunism 
Vendor firm size is negatively related to buyer’s perceptions of 
opportunism. 
Vendor size and 
technological 
uncertainty 
Vendor firm size is negatively related to buyers’ perceptions of 
technological uncertainty.   
Vendor reputation 
and opportunism 









There is a positive relationship between buyers’ perceptions of 
technological uncertainty and vendor opportunism. 





Table 3.10: Summary Overview of the Control Variables in Essay 1 
Construct Definition Summary 
Buyer Size Various scholars have generally 
measured in terms of the number of 
employees or the annual revenues 
(Krause et al., 1999; Larson et al., 2005). 
Nooteboom (1992) states that both buyer 
and supplier firm size influence the 
perceptions of dependency in an 
exchange.  Smaller or larger buyer size 
is also cited as a determinant of higher 
or lower power-dependency on the part 
of the buyer (Anderson & Naurus, 1990; 
Kim, 2000).  Larson et al. (2005) 
contend that larger buyers are more 
inclined to develop long-term relational 
exchange with larger suppliers due to the 
reason that smaller vendors are viewed 
as having short-term orientation. 




Idiosyncratic investments or relationship-
specific investments, also termed as asset 
specificity in TCA literature (Geyskens 
et al., 2006, Williamson, 1985) are assets 
that are employed for a particular 
exchange and have little if any residual 
value outside that exchange.   
From a buyer’s perspective, the 
willingness of the supplier to invest in 
relationship-specific investments can 
also indicate to the buyer that a supplier 
can be trusted (Ganesan, 1994) thereby 
reducing buyer’s perceptions of vendor 
opportunism.  Although Heide (1994) 
contends that relationship-specific 
investments lead to dependence and 
hence increase the risk of opportunistic 
behavior on the part of exchange 




Information sharing/exchange is defined 
by Cannon and Perreault (1999, p. 441) 
as “expectations of open sharing of 
information” on the part of both the 
buyer and the seller.   
Open channels of communication as 
well as effective exchange of 
information from the supplier/vendor 
provide buyers with insights into a 
supplier’s future plans (Cannon & 
Homburg, 2001) thereby enabling them 
to adjust their internal operational needs 
and processes.  Information asymmetry, 
whereby one party in an exchange has 
more information than the other, is cited 
as a condition that fosters opportunistic 
behavior in a principal-agent 
relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Wathne 
& Heide, 2000).   
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Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey.  You must be at least 21 years or 
older to participate in this survey.  This survey focuses on IT outsourcing.  The purpose 
of the study is to develop a better understanding of organizational buyers’ perceptions of 
outsourcing IT providers during the vendor evaluation process.  You may opt out of the 
survey at any time with no penalty.  You are invited to participate because of your 
procurement position within your company.  Please be assured that your responses will 
remain completely anonymous and in no way will you, personally, or your company, in 
general, be identifiable in the final results. 
Your participation in this study will allow us to gain important insights into 
organizational buyers’ vendor selection decisions within an IT outsourcing context.  
Participation in this study will require approximately 10-15 minutes of your time.  
Instructions are provided for each section of this survey.  This research is not affiliated in 
any way with any firm or commercial enterprise.  Although there may be no direct 
benefit to you, the participant, in taking part in this study, your involvement will help 
broaden the understanding of how vendor firm characteristics affect buyer’s perceptions 
of those vendors as well as their vendor relationship choices.  The results (in aggregate) 
of the study will be available upon request to those who participate.  Your participation in 
this survey is voluntary and may be withdrawn without penalty at any time.  The research 
has no risks or implied responsibilities to the respondents.  Please contact Imran M. 
Khan, Doctoral Candidate at 270-809-6202 or ikhan5@students.kennesaw.edu or Brian 
N. Rutherford, Ph.D., at bruther1@kennesaw.edu if you have any questions about this 
study.  Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried 
out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board.  Questions or problems 
regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, 
Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, 
(678) 797-2268.  
 
PLEASE PRINT A COPY OF THIS CONSENT DOCUMENT FOR YOUR RECORDS, 
OR IF YOU DO NOT HAVE PRINT CAPABILITIES, YOU MAY CONTACT THE 




_________ I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project.  I 
understand that participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time 






_________ I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the 
questions. 
 






IT OUTSOURCING  
 
Many organizations today are choosing to outsource in order to reduce costs as well as 
increase focus on their core competencies.  Outsourcing involves the purchase of any 
goods or services by an organization from an outside firm.  Outsourcing includes both 
business process outsourcing (such as outsourcing of payroll function) as well as IT 
outsourcing (such as cloud computing, application outsourcing, network management 
outsourcing, etc.).   
 
This research specifically focuses on IT outsourcing whereby an organization outsources 
various IT functions/services/solutions from an outside vendor.  Some examples of IT 
outsourced services include: data center services, data storage, software as a service, 
application outsourcing, managed services, cloud computing, and others.  Furthermore, 
IT outsourcing also includes network management functions whereby a provider manages 
a firm’s network infrastructure.   
 
We are interested in understanding your perspectives on IT outsourcing as well as 
vendors of such solutions/services.   
  
 
1. Are you currently involved or have been involved in IT outsourcing 





If no is selected, please skip to the end of the survey.  
 
2.  In the past 12 months, have you been involved in an IT outsourcing decision?  
 
 Yes, I have been involved in an IT outsourcing decision at my current 
organization  
 Yes, I had been involved in an IT outsourcing decision at the company I worked 
for previously 
 No, I have not been involved in an IT outsourcing decision  
 
If no is selected, please skip to the end of the survey.  
 
 
3.   Which of the following best describes your role in the IT decision-making within 
your organization? 
 
 I have the final purchasing approval for my organization’s IT decisions including 
outsourcing  
 I recommend or influence my organization’s IT decisions including outsourcing 




 I am not involved in IT outsourcing decisions  
 
If option 3 is selected, please skip to the end of the survey. 
 
4.  Overall, how many people are typically involved in an IT outsourcing purchase 
decision in your organization? 
 
 ____________________  
 
 
5.  Please identify the most recent (within the last 12 months) IT function/solution/service 
that your organization outsourced that required your organization to evaluate multiple 
vendors.  Some examples of outsourced IT solutions include cloud computing, software 
as a service, infrastructure as a service, application hosting and management such as 
electronic medical record solutions, data center services, network security management, 




6. Please list how many total vendors your organization evaluated for the above listed 
outsourced IT function/solution/service. 
 
______________________ (Numeric field only) 
 
7(a). Please identify the vendor your organization selected for __________  
 
_________________________ (Vendor we selected) 
 
7(b). You said that you evaluated ___________ vendors.  (Please identify at least TWO 
other vendors that your organization evaluated but DID NOT select.  
 
_________________________ (Vendor that we evaluated but DID NOT select) 
 
_________________________ (Vendor that we evaluated but DID NOT select) 
 
_________________________ (Vendor that we evaluated but DID NOT select) 
 
_________________________ (Vendor that we evaluated but DID NOT select)  
 
8.  From the list of vendors that your organization evaluated but DID NOT select please 
select a vendor that you are MOST familiar with, i.e. one that your organization closely 














We are interested in finding out more about the vendor that your organization closely 
evaluated but DID NOT select for any outsourcing solution/function/service.  
Specifically, we are trying to understand the extent to which certain factors impacted 
your organization’s decision to not select ____________.  All of the questions below 
pertain to your perceptions of this vendor. 
 
10. Please tell us your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements as 
they pertain to _____________.  
 
        Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
 
This vendor is a very large company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
 
This vendor is the industry's biggest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
vendor of this solution 
 
There are not many vendors  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
as large as this vendor  
 
This vendor is among the  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
largest in its industry  
 
This vendor is a small   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
player in the market (R) 
 
This vendor has a reputation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
for being honest 
 
This vendor has a reputation for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
being concerned about its customers 
 
This vendor has a good  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
reputation in the market 
 
Most buyers think that this  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 








New Web Page 
 
Please tell us your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements as they 
pertain to _____________.  
 
Strongly Disagree     Strongly Agree 
 
This vendor stands  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
behind its products and  
services 
 
This vendor develops  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
innovative products and  
services 
 
This vendor offers high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
quality products and  
services 
 
This vendor offers products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
and services that are a good  
value for money 
 
This vendor has excellent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
leadership  
 
This vendor has a clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
vision for its future  
 
This vendor recognizes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







11.  Please tell us the extent to which the following statements provide an 
inaccurate/accurate description of the reasons for NOT SELECTING ____________?   
 
While evaluating this vendor, my organization felt that:  
 
Completely     Completely  
Inaccurate     Accurate  
Description    Description  
 
On occasion, this vendor   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would have lied about certain  
things in order to protect  
their interests 
 
This vendor would have  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
promised to do things without  
actually doing them later   
 
This vendor would not have  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
always acted in accordance  
with our contract(s)      
 
This vendor would have  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
tried to breach informal  
agreements between our  
companies to maximize their  
own benefit  
 
This vendor would have  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
tried to take advantage of  
"holes" in our contract to  
further their own interest   
 
 
This vendor would have  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
used unexpected events to  




12.  Please express the extent to which technical changes with the vendor that your 







          Predictable 
    Unpredictable 
 
Technological changes  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
in this vendor’s solution are  
   
Technological developments  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
in the market for the identified 
outsourced solution are    
 
Your organization’s changes   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
in specifications for the identified 
outsourced solution are  
 
This vendor’s changes in  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
specifications for the identified  
outsourced solution are   
      
 
Please express your level of disagreement/agreement with the following statement as it 
pertains to your organization: 
          Strongly          Strongly  
Disagree   Agree 
 
(M1) My organization         0………………………………100  
devotes a lot of effort to  
charitable programs. 
 
(M2) My organization is    0………………………………100   
committed to preserving  
the natural environment.    
 
(M3) My organization is    0………………………………100 
committed to the betterment  




When outsourcing, buying organizations often have a choice of entering into an arm’s 
length, formal relationship with their vendor or they can enter into a more flexible 
relationship with their vendor that can then be modified as the relationship progresses.   
 
13.  For the vendor that your organization closely evaluated but DID NOT select, we are 
interested in finding out about the nature of relationship your organization would have 




        Strongly         Strongly 
        Disagree           Agree 
 
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have had formal written  
agreements outlining the  
operational requirements  
of this vendor 
    
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have had formal written  
agreements that detail how  
this vendor’s performance  
would be monitored 
   
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have had formal written  
agreements outlining  
warranty policies  
      
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have had formal written  
agreements outlining how  
to handle complaints and disputes 
      
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have had formal written  
agreements outlining the  
level of service expected  
from this vendor    
   
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have had an extremely  
collaborative relationship  





My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have shared long and  
short-term goals and plans  
with this vendor  
 
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have relied on this vendor  
to keep promises   
 
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have been willing to share  
any information that may  
be of use to this vendor    
 
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have been willing to make  
adjustments in our  relationship  
with this vendor to cope with  
changing circumstances  
 
My organization would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have been willing to view  
this vendor as a partner 
 
Q.14. For the vendor that your organization closely evaluated but DID NOT SELECT, 
please express the level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements. 
 
Strongly     Strongly    
Disagree     Agree 
       
 
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
have gone out of its  
way to link us with its  
business 
 
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have made significant 
investments in training  
our people  
 
It would have been  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
difficult for this vendor to  
repurpose its investment in  





This vendor would   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have done a lot to help  
us become more effective  
by providing specialized  
training 
 
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have put on helpful  
programs designed to  
enhance our overall business 
 
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have shared proprietary  
information with us    
 
New web page 
 
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have shared confidential  
information to help us 
      
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have frequently talked with  
us about its business strategy 
 
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have frequently discussed  
strategic issues with us   
 
This vendor would  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
have openly shared  
confidential information  















_____________ Years __________________ Months (this can be numerical 
fields only with maximum value of 30 for Years and 12 for months) 
 





 Administrative and Support Services 
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 
 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
 Banking, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 
 Construction 
 Educational Services 
 Federal Government 
 Food Services  
 Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles 
 Hospitals 
 Insurance Carriers and Related Activities 
 Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals, and Data Processing 
Services 
 IT Services 
 Local/State Government 
 Management of Companies and Enterprises 
 Manufacturing 
 Nursing and Residential Care Facilities 
 Physicians, Ambulatory Health Care Services 
 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
 Publishing, Motion Pictures, Broadcasting 
 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 
 Retail Trade 
 Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments and 
Related Activities 
 Social Assistance 
 Telecommunications 
 Transportation and Warehousing 
 Waste Management and Remediation Services 
 Wholesale Trade 
 Other ______________ 
 









 Senior level/executive management/VP 
 Mid-level Management 
 MIS/IS/IT Administrator 
 Business Manager 
 Other (please specify) _______________________ 
 
19. Overall, how many years of IT procurement experience do you have? 
 
____________ Years ____________ Months  
 
 
20. What is the approximate dollar value of IT procurement for which you are 














23. Please estimate your organization’s average annual IT budget? 
 
($) ____________________/year  
 
 






25. Please indicate the total number of locations for your organization (across all 
regions).  ________________  
 
 
Thank you for your time and participation.  Should you have interest in receiving a 
summary of the research findings, please provide a contact e-mail address: 
___________________________________________. 
